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OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE OF NORDIC PRIVATE EQUITY BACKED 
BUYOUTS IN THE RECESSION OF 2007-2009 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
While buyouts in the 1980s have been shown to improve operational performance of 
companies significantly, more recent studies have found little evidence of improved 
operational performance. However, due to limited scope in previous studies, 
understanding on how performance varies across transaction types, time periods, and 
geographies is limited. Moreover, buyout research lacks knowledge on how the 
companies acquired in the latest buyout boom have weathered the subsequent downturn.  
This thesis contributes to the existing literature by studying the operational impact of a 
comprehensive sample of Nordic private equity backed buyouts in the recession of 
2007-2009. Unlike previous studies, I provide evidence on both private-to-private and 
public-to-private transactions. 
DATA 
I study 144 companies domiciled in Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Denmark acquired 
by a private equity fund within the time period from 1.1.2005 to 30.6.2007. I combine a 
hand-collected deal characteristics data from M&A databases and news articles to 
accounting data to create a novel dataset that allows for comparison of various 
operational measures in 2007-2009 across deal types and geographies. I benchmark the 
performance measures against an industry- and size-matched peer group. 
RESULTS 
My findings support the hypothesis on private equity model’s ability to create economic 
value also in tough economic conditions. Private equity backed companies have 
outperformed their peers in terms of profitability and working capital efficiency. While 
employee productivity increases relative to benchmark, I find no significant difference 
in wage or employment development after the buyout. Decreasing personnel costs in 
relation to sales and higher leverage are associated with greater abnormal profitability.  
 
Performance varies significantly variation between deal types, suggesting different 
underlying motivations for alternative types of buyouts. Swedish and Norwegian 
buyouts have performed clearly better than Finnish and Danish buyouts. 
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PÄÄOMASIJOITTAJIEN OMISTAMIEN POHJOISMAISTEN YRITYSTEN 
OPERATIONAALINEN TEHOKKUUS VUOSIEN 2007-2009 TAANTUMASSA  
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Aikaisemmat tutkimukset ovat osoittaneet 1980- luvun velkarahoitteisten yritysostojen 
parantaneen yritysten operationaalista tehokkuutta. Viimeaikaiset tutkimukset eivät 
kuitenkaan ole löytäneet merkittävää menestyseroa. Ymmärrys tehokkuuseroista 
transaktiotyyppien, ajanjaksojen ja maantieteellisten alueiden välillä on kuitenkin 
olematonta aikaisempien tutkimusten kapea-alaisuuden takia. Aikaisempi tutkimus ei 
myöskään käsittele sitä, miten viimeisimmässä korkeasuhdanteessa tehdyt transaktiot 
ovat pärjänneet viime vuosien taantumassa. Tämä tutkielma laajentaa aikaisempaa 
kirjallisuutta tutkimalla miten pääomasijoittajien pohjoismaissa tekemät yritysostot ovat 
vaikuttaneet operatiiviseen tehokkuuteen vuosien 2007–2009 taantumassa. 
Aikaisemmista tutkimuksista poiketen, aineistoni käsittää niin julkisten kuin yksityisten 
yritysten ostot. 
LÄHDEAINEISTO 
Tutkimusaineisto käsittää 144 Ruotsalaista, Suomalaista, Norjalaista ja Tanskalaista 
yritystä, jotka pääomasijoittaja on ostanut aikavälillä 1.1.2005–30.6.2007. Aineisto 
sisältää yrityskauppatietokannoista ja uutisista käsin kootut transaktio-kohtaiset tarkat 
tiedot, sekä yritysten tilinpäätökset. Lopullinen aineisto mahdollistaa operationaalisen 
tehokkuuden vertailun transaktiotyyppien ja maiden välillä vuosina 2007–2009. 
Yrityskohtaisia tehokkuusmittareita vertaillaan toimialan ja koon perusteella koottuihin 
verrokkiryhmiin. 
TULOKSET 
Tulokset osoittavat, että pääomasijoittajat ovat pystyneet luomaan arvoa myös 
matalasuhdanteessa. Pääomasijoittajien omistuksessa olleet yritykset o vat pärjänneet 
paremmin kannattavuudessa ja käyttöpääoman tehokkuudessa. Työntekijöiden 
tuottavuus ilman että työntekijöiden palkoissa tai määrissä on tilastollisesti merkittävää 
laskua suhteessa verrokkeihin. Laskeneilla henkilöstökustannuksilla suhteessa 
liikevaihtoon ja korkeammalla velkaantuneisuudella on ollut positiivinen yhteys 
suurempaan kannattavuuseroon verrokkiryhmään verrattuna.  
 
Operationaalinen tehokkuus kuitenkin vaihtelee suuresti transaktiotyyppien välillä, 
mikä voi tarkoittaa taustalla vaikuttavien päämäärien olevan erilaisia näiden tyyppien 
välillä. Ruotsalaiset ja norjalaiset yrityskaupat ovat pärjänneet suomalaisia ja 
tanskalaisia selvästi paremmin.  
AVAINSANAT 
Pääomasijoittaminen, yritysostot, yrityskauppa 
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1 Introduction 
Leveraged buyouts first became a major phenomenon during the 1980s, when the soaring 
stock markets and cheap financing contributed to a series of high-profile buyout transactions. 
However, many of the transactions made in the late 1980s failed in the subsequent economic 
downturn, and it took nearly 15 years before the market revived to a new all-time high in the 
second leveraged buyout wave of the mid-2000s. Record amounts of capital were committed 
to private equity, and high-profile public-to-private transactions reappeared. Although the 
subsequent credit crisis froze the market again in 2008, the long-term trend shows that 
leveraged buyouts and private equity have become major factors in the financial markets. 
Many of the studies since 1980s have found support for the ability of leveraged buyouts to 
enhance the operational performance of the companies and create economic value (Kaplan, 
1989; Smith, 1990). Jensen (1989) argued that gains in operating performance are attributable 
to reduced agency costs through better governance and leverage. However, later studies have 
shown little (or no) evidence on performance gains (Acharya et al., 2010; Guo et al., 2011), 
potentially reflecting the adoption of better governance structures and incentive schemes in 
public corporations. 
An open question in the buyout literature is how leveraged buyouts weather the recession. If 
the firms are able to better adjust in adverse shocks, the underlying operations can be in better 
shape than their peers. Jensen (1989) argues that high levels of debt forces early and intense 
response to negative shocks. Thus, high leverage entailed in buyout transactions could push 
portfolio companies to react more quickly to downturns, leading to better performance in 
adverse economic conditions than their less- levered peers.  Andrade and Kaplan (1998) find 
that the net effect of LBO and distress after the 1980s wave was on average slightly positive. 
Moreover, majority of the studies have been performed in the U.S. and U.K. markets, and are 
concentrated on public-to-private transactions for which data is more readily available. Thus,  
existing research lacks understanding of how performance varies across transaction types, 
time periods, and countries. Existing literature does not provide evidence on the subsequent 
operational performance of buyouts made in the most recent buyout boom, which is of 
paramount importance due to the huge number of transactions fuelled by overly optimistic 
credit markets at the time.  
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This thesis aims to fill this gap by studying a novel sample of Nordic private equity backed 
buyouts completed in the latest buyout boom. The aim is to answer whether private equity 
ownership model has had positive effect on economic value in the acquired companies in the 
recession of 2007-2009. I assess the magnitude and determinants of abnormal performance of 
various operating performance measures including profitability, working capital, and 
personnel ratios, and how they vary across deal types and countries. Further, by shedding 
light on how private equity backed companies have performed in the financial crisis I provide 
insights on the returns to private equity as an asset class in the Nordic countries over the next 
five years. No previous research exists that covers the entire homogenous Nordic buyout 
market or provides evidence on the differences between transaction types. 
The data covers 144 companies domiciled in Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Denmark 
acquired within the time period from 1.1.2005 to 30.6.2007 with revenue over €15 million at 
the time of the acquisition. I combine a hand-collected deal characteristics data from various 
databases and news articles to accounting data to create a novel dataset that allows for 
comparison of performance in 2007-2009 across deal types and geographies. I find that 
companies acquired by private equity funds have had significantly better performance in 
terms of profitability, sales growth, and working capital relative to industry- and size-matched 
benchmark, although significant variation exists across deal types and countries. Multivariate 
regressions suggest that leverage and personnel costs in relation to sales may contribute to 
higher abnormal performance. 
There are three important limitations that should be noted. First, the focus of this thesis is not 
to measure aggregate effect of private equity activity, but rather examine the average effect of 
private equity ownership in their portfolio companies. Secondly, the data does not cover the 
whole variety of buyouts, but only those conducted by professional private equity firms. 
Thirdly, for some of the identified buyout targets accounting data was unavailable for 
unknown reasons. The data availability and potential biases is further discussed in Chapter 5. 
In the next chapter, I define the concepts and provide an introduction to the private equity 
business model, and relevant descriptive research. In Chapter 3, I present and discuss the 
theories of value creation and the empirical evidence on the impact of private equity and 
leveraged buyouts to the acquired companies. Chapter 4 specifies the hypotheses. In Chapter 
5, I describe the data gathering process and discuss the methodological choices. Chapter 6 
presents the results, and Chapter 7 concludes. 
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2 Private equity industry 
This chapter presents the private equity model, including how a private equity is organized, 
how a typical transaction is structured, and the different players and their roles in the process, 
including related concepts and terminology. 
2.1 Definitions 
In the broadest sense, private equity can be defined as an asset class that consists of medium 
to long-term investments of equity or equity-related capital in companies that are usually not 
traded on a public stock exchange. Private equity can be divided into sub-classes based on 
investment strategies of the private equity firm that relate closely to stage of development of 
the company that receives the financing.  
There are variations in how the terms buyouts, venture capital and growth equity is used. 
However, venture capital is commonly used in the case of financing of start-ups and other 
companies with limited revenue and high growth potential. Growth equity balances between 
buyouts and venture capital, and often involves minority investments in established 
companies needing additional cash to support high growth. In finance literature, private equity 
investments are typically divided into venture capital and leveraged buyouts. In this paper, I 
focus on the latter. 
Leveraged buyout (LBO) refers to a transaction in which a company is acquired from its 
shareholders, typically with a relatively small amount of equity and relatively large amount of 
debt financing. In a typical LBO transaction, a private equity fund acquires majority 
ownership of a mature firm with relatively steady cash flows, which is the main distinction to 
venture capital. 
Leveraged buyouts can be further divided to sub-classes based on the characteristics of the 
driving forces behind the transactions. Some studies make a distinction between insider 
driven management buyouts (MBOs) and outsider driven management buyins (MBIs). Some 
studies even separate these management- led buyouts from private equity sponsored 
institutional buyouts (IBOs). Similarly, deals could be classified as public-to-private 
transactions, which involve taking private a listed company, private-to-privates and divisional 
buyouts. Alternatively, some studies divide their sample based on whether a deal involves 
financial sponsor, i.e. is backed by a private equity fund or not.  
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However, the term LBO can be generally used to refer to leveraged buyout transact ions made 
by private equity firms (Similar to Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; Officer et al., 2010). Where 
possible, I make the distinction between the different subclasses, but generally use the terms 
LBO and private equity sponsored deal interchangeably, and by private equity firms mean 
those firms that make leveraged buyouts.  
2.2 Private equity model 
This section presents the private equity model: how a private equity is organized, how a 
typical transaction is structured, and the different stakeholders and their roles. 
2.2.1 Private equity firms 
A private equity firm is an investment management company, usually organized as a 
partnership or limited liability corporation. Private equity firms establish investment funds 
that collect capital from investors, make investing decisions, and take active role in the 
strategic management of investee companies, typically called portfolio companies.  
2.2.2 Private equity funds 
Figure 1 illustrates a typical structure of a private equity fund. Funds are typically structured 
as limited partnerships in which the private equity firms act as General Partners (GPs) and 
manage the fund, and investors act as limited partners providing the majority of capital. 
Limited partners (LPs) typically include institutional investors such as banks, pension funds 
and insurance companies, funds-of-funds, wealthy individuals and family investment 
vehicles. (EVCA, 2007)  
Figure 1 – A typical private equity fund structure 
 
Private equity fund
Limited Partners (LPs)General Partner (GP)
Private Equity firm
Institutional investors
Funds of funds
Etc.
Portfolio company B Portfolio company CPortfolio company A
Carried interest
Services Capital
Capital interestManagement fee
5 
 
 
Private equity firms raise equity capital to a private equity fund in a process that usually takes 
up to one year. Funds are for the most part “closed-end” funds, meaning that after investors 
commit a certain amount of capital to the fund it cannot leave it before end of its life. Once 
the capital has been raised, general partners make investment decisions following the 
investment strategy defined in the covenants in the fund agreement. Typical covenants impose 
restrictions on how much fund capital can be invested in a single company, the types of 
securities, and debt at the fund level. (Metrick and Yasuda, 2010a; Strömberg, 2009) 
A typical fund has a lifetime of ten years, which can be divided into two parts. First, the 
general partners have typically five years to invest the committed capital in new portfolio 
companies. The final five years are reserved for follow-on investments and the exiting of 
existing portfolio companies. The five-year period meant to return the capital to investors can 
be extended up to 8 years. 
Over the investment period, drawdowns, or capital calls, are issued to limited partners when 
the private equity firm has identified an investment opportunity, requiring a portion of the 
limited partner's committed capital to be paid. The year of the first drawdown of the 
committed capital is known as the fund's vintage year. The cumulative amount of drawn 
down capital that has actually been invested into the fund's portfolio companies is referred to 
as invested capital. 
Axelson et al. (2009) classify private equity transactions to three main forms. First, a single 
private equity firm might find a target and work on an exclusive basis with the potential 
seller, under an exclusivity agreement 1 . These deals are increasingly rare in case of large 
buyouts, but still exist particularly for small deals. The second, and most prominent type of 
transaction, involves multiple private equity firms competing for the target in an auction.  In 
some large deals, groups of private equity funds might combine in “club deals” to limit 
exposure to a single company, often stipulated in the fund agreement covenants. The third 
class of transactions is public-to-private deals, where a fund targets a publicly listed company. 
These deals are by nature friendly tender offers, as the support of the management is required 
in order to perform a thorough due diligence on the target. 
Figure 2 depicts how a typical private equity transaction is performed. The private equity firm 
will form a new holding company “NewCo” to bid for a stake in the target company. Private 
                                                 
1
 In exclusivity agreement vendor may grant management a period of exclusivity during which time the vendor 
will not market the business to other potential buyers. 
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equity firms raise capital to this holding company, and invest the debt capital together with 
their equity to acquire the target company. Subsequently, the holding company is often 
merged with the target company to form the portfolio company. 
Figure 2 – Structure of a typical private equity transaction 
 
2.2.3 Compensation 
Compensation structures of General Partners in a private equity funds can be divided into 
fixed and variable components, management fee being the sole fixed component, and the rest 
comprising performance based and various other variable fees. Metrick and Yasuda (2010b) 
provide a comprehensive review of compensation structures of 144 buyout funds raised 
between 1992 and 2006. 
The fixed management fee can be assessed by four alternative methods (Metrick and Yasuda, 
2010b). First, the historically most common method was a constant percentage of committed 
capital, the most common rate being 2%, amounting to a total of 20% of committed capital 
over the fund lifetime. Second, in more recent years, funds have adopted a decreasing fee 
structure, with the percentage falling after the initial five year investment period (e.g. 2% for 
the first five years, then falling 0.25% per year). Third alternative uses a constant rate but 
changes the basis from committed capital to net invested capital after five years. Finally, 
some funds use a combination of decreasing rate and a change from committed to net invested 
capital. Metrick and Yasuda (2010b) find that 84% of buyout funds switch to invested capital 
basis, 45% lower the fee level, and that 39% of buyout funds do both. As a result, they 
conclude that median present value of lifetime management fees is 10.3% percent of 
committed capital for buyout funds. 
Target company
Senior debt
• Loan tranche A
• Loan tranche B
• Loan tranche C
2nd-lien loans
High-yield debt
Payble-in-kind debt
Equity
”NewCo”
Banks and 
institutional
investors
Private equity fund
High-yield investors
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Variable fees can come in three forms: performance based carried interest, transaction fees, 
and monitoring fees. The first, carried interest, provides majority of expected variable revenue 
for successful buyout funds. The amount of carried interest a General Partner receives 
depends on four different concepts, defined in the fund agreement: carry level, carry basis, 
carry hurdle, and carry timing. The carry level refers to the percentage of profits (defined by 
the other three elements) GPs receive. Carry basis refers to the standard by which profits are 
measured. The carry hurdle refers to a level of returns that GP must exceed in order to gain 
any carried interest. Finally, carry timing refers to rules that govern the timing of carried 
interest distributions. 
In their sample, Metrick and Yasuda (2010b) find that all 144 buyout funds use 20% carry 
level, which is almost always the case in the industry. For carry basis, 83% of the buyout 
funds use committed capital, and the rest investment capital. In the sample, 93% of buyout 
funds use a hurdle rate, with three quarters having set an 8% hurdle rate. However, the effect 
of hurdle return is affected by the fact that majority of funds have catch-up rate of 100%, 
meaning that after the hurdle rate has been reached, GPs get 100% of the incremental profits 
until carry level is reached, after which the profits are split according to the carry level.  Thus, 
in a typical successful fund, GPs receive 20% of all profits despite the hurdle rate. The fourth 
element, carry timing, can vary significantly. Funds use a variety of rules to allow carried 
interest upon a profitable exit, thus realizing profits already before the end of fund life-cycle. 
However, LPs typically have ability to “clawback” these distributions if performance in later 
investments is insufficient.  
The final typical variable fee components for buyout funds are transaction fees and 
monitoring fees. When a buyout fund buys or sells a company, they charge a transaction fee 
similar to the M&A advisory fee. However, GPs do not get the full benefit of these fees, as 
about 80% of fund agreements state that GPs share 50-100% of the fee with LPs.  Similar 
sharing arrangement is typical for monitoring fee. Transaction and monitoring fees depend on 
company size and performance.  Transaction fees for small deals can be as high as 2%, 
decreasing with deal size. Monitoring fees range between one and five percent of EBITDA 
each year, smaller companies ending up paying more.  
Against the general belief of bulk of the fees coming from performance, the authors find that 
the median buyout fund earns 19.4% of the committed capital as fees, of which 11.8% are 
fixed.  The median present value of fixed management fee is 10.3%, while the median carried 
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interest for a buyout fund amounts to only 5.4% of committed capital. Transaction and 
management fees amount to 3.6%. These significant fees charged by the General Partners 
have serious implications for private equity investors. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and 
Phalippou and Gottschlag (2009) find that the excess returns generated by private equity at 
the firm level fall in the hands of general partners, resulting average returns below S&P 500 
for investors.  
Phalippou (2009) argues that selective reporting of returns and opaque fee structures can 
delude investors to believe that returns are higher than they de facto are. About half of the 
investments listed in the average fund-raising prospectus are fully realized, which allows for 
discretionary valuation for half of the investments. In addition, reported internal rates of 
returns (IRR) can be arbitrarily pooled, resulting in biased averages as investments with 
higher IRRs tend to be shorter. Moreover, funds tend to choose measures that look best in 
each case, and report track records selectively. 
Phalippou (2009) also raises concerns about agency conflicts between the private equity firm 
and limited partners. First, general partners have incentive to liquidate good investments 
quickly while delaying exits from poorly performing investments. Carried interest from 
successful exits is received immediately, but “clawed back” at exit from poor investment, 
leaving the time value for GPs. Second, GPs have incentive to exit early due to contracts 
allowing for reinvestment of short investments, and thus increase of assets under 
management. Moreover, IRRs is inflated by quick exist due to the reinvestment assumption in 
IRR calculation. Third, transaction fees based on deal value and company size can distort 
choices in relation to leverage, size and number of transactions that occur.  
2.2.4 Capital structures 
Understanding the complex capital structures in leveraged buyouts is of great importance, as 
it plays an important role in the both in the theory of value creation and economic 
implications of the private equity industry as a whole. In broadest sense, capital structure can 
be divided into equity and debt. However, as the private equity industry has developed, 
capital structures have become highly complicated, and boundaries between the classical 
division to debt and equity have faded. 
Equity investors in a private equity deal typically include private equity fund, which invests 
by far the largest share of equity. In addition, the management team of the target company 
typically also buys a small stake in the target company, typically somewhere around 15% of 
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total equity (Kaplan 1989a; Kaplan and Strömberg 2009; Guo et al. 2011; Acharya et al. 
2010). 
The debt is often structured to senior and subordinated tranches. Senior tranches can have 
portions with unequal maturities, payment schedules and seniority. For example, senior debt 
portion can be divided into 50 percent amortizing, and 50 percent bullet loan, the former 
being senior to latter and having longer maturity. The second part, subordinated portion, 
usually consists of 2nd lien and mezzanine debt. Mezzanine debt often involves, in addition to 
cash interest, a payable-in-kind (PIK) interest. This means that instead of cash interest 
payments the principal amount of the loan is increased. The rationale behind this arrangement 
is to ease the problem of constrained cash flow of the target company to pay the relatively 
high interest payments of mezzanine debt until the senior portion is amortized, or the target 
company sold to the subsequent acquirer. In addition, the debt structure often involves 
contingent debt, which can mean revolving credit facilities to finance working capital, or 
relate to some specific capital expenditure or identified acquisition. 
Cotter and Peck (2001) argue that a 75% debt-to-equity ratio for buyouts is rather typical, 
consistent with Axelson et al. (2009).  However, the amount of equity financing in a deal has 
varied over time. Kaplan (1989a) finds median leverage of 88% in his sample of 76 public-to-
private MBOs in 1980-1986. Axelson et al. (2009) report slightly lower leverage in the late 
1980s and the first part of 1990s (82% and 74%, respectively). After decreasing in the late 
1990s (73%) and early 2000s (72%), in the final sample period of 2003-2006 leverage rises to 
78%. Guo et al. (2011) report significant variation in their sample of 192 public-to-private 
buyouts in 1990-2006, with a median debt-to-capital of about 30 percent. Thus, it is 
somewhat fair to conclude that capital structures have seen a decreasing trend in leverage 
since the 1980s, with significant cyclicality over the years.  
Figure 3 provides an example of a typical capital structure. Axelson et al. (2010) find that in 
their sample of 153 large buyouts from 1985-2006 an average of 81.3% of total non-equity 
financing is composed of bank debt, and broken down to on average 3.8 tranches. Senior bank 
debt provides 52.0%, junior bank debt 4.7%, and contingent debt 24.6%. In addition to bank 
debt, 13.6% is financing from bonds.2 
 
                                                 
2
 Axelson et al. (2010) also provide detailed  information on interest rates paid on the debt tranches and speed of 
debt repayment in their sample. 
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Figure 3 – Typical capital structure in leveraged buyout 
This figure describes the capital structure of a secondary buyout of Kwik-Fit in August 2005. 
Enterprise value totals £774 million, of which £583 million is debt. Corresponding maturities and 
interest rates for the debt tranches are reported on the right hand side of the figure. PIK is payable-in-
kind. Adapted from Axelson et al. (2010) 
 
2.2.5 Pricing 
Due to the lax disclosure requirements, evidence on pricing of private equity transactions is 
limited to acquisitions of public companies. However, studies provide evidence on evolution 
of deal pricing, and investigate the underlying determinants that can drive pricing in leveraged 
buyouts. 
Kaplan and Stein (1993) describe pricing of U.S. public-to-private deals made in the 1980s. 
They find average EV to EBITDA multiples of 7.8 for the whole period, peaking during the 
hot LBO market in 1987. Guo et al. (2011), who use similar data of U.S. public-to-private 
deals, find that valuation multiples in the recent boom exceeded those in the 1980s boom. 
Comparing the results of Kaplan and Stein (1993) and Guo et al. (2011), Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2009) find that valuations of leveraged buyout deals relative to the Standard and 
Poor’s 500 are actually slightly lower in the most recent wave.3 
                                                 
3
 For more complete international comparison of deal pricing, see Renneboog et al. (2007) 
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Strömberg (2008) documents variation in deal pricing in the 1995-2007 period across time, 
deal type and geography. They find that the mean (median) enterprise value to revenue is 2.4 
(0.9) and mean (median) enterprise value to EBITDA is 11.0 (8.0). After decreasing in the 
early 2000’s, pricing multiples were at their historical highs in the 2006 and 2007. Moreover, 
their findings suggest that LBOs of public companies experience slightly higher EBITDA 
multiples than LBOs of private companies. However, as data on value and pricing is missing 
for a large fraction of deals, ability to draw conclusions is limited. 
In a typical public-to-private transaction, a private equity acquirer pays a premium of about 
30 percent (Bargeron et al., 2008; Renneboog et al., 2007). Bargeron et al. (2008) provide 
alternative explanations for pricing differences between private equity firms versus public and 
private operating companies. Firstly, public and private firms could acquire different types of 
firms. Secondly, operating companies should be able to pay more as they can expect to have 
synergy gains that are, at least in theory, shared with the target. Thirdly, the authors provide 
possible explanations why pricing should depend on organizational form of the bidder. They 
argue that managers in public firms could be more reluctant to walk away from a deal.  
Additional explanation is provided by Jensen (1989), who argues that agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders can lead to managers making poor acquisitions to gain 
private benefits.  
Bargeron et al. (2008) find that target shareholders earn 35% higher premiums if a public firm 
makes the acquisition rather than a private firm. Target shareholders earn 63% higher 
premiums with public bidders rather than private equity bidders. The authors find evidence 
suggesting that private operating companies pay more for acquisitions because they expect 
benefits from synergies. Moreover, private firms are much less reluctant to walk away from a 
deal that are public firms, and the difference in abnormal returns is highest between 
acquisitions made by private equity firms and those by public acquirers with low managerial 
ownership. 
Axelson et al. (2010) study the relation between pricing and leverage, as availability of debt 
financing is often claimed to drive the pricing in buyouts. They find that higher loan rates 
have a negative impact on both leverage and prices in buyouts, in contrast to limited impact in 
lending of public firms.  
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2.2.6 Exit channels 
Compensation structure of a private equity fund is highly dependent on carried interest, which 
in turn is dependent on timing of exit and proceeds. Thus, exiting the investment is crucial 
aspect in the financial performance of private equity companies. 
Strömberg (2008) studies a large international sample of LBOs, and finds that the most 
common exit route for LBOs with financial sponsor are trade sales to another corporation, 
accounting for 38% of all exits. The second most common exit route is secondary buyouts 
(24%), in which portfolio company is sold to another financial buyer.  IPOs account for 13% 
of exits. While the importance of secondary buyouts as an exit route has increased over time, 
IPOs have decreased from about one-fourth in the late 1980s and early 1990s to 
approximately 10% in the first half of 2000s.  
Due to the high leverage, a potentially high fraction of LBOs end up in bankruptcy or 
financial distress. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) found that 23% of large public-to-private 
transactions in the 1980s had defaulted on their debt payments. Moreover, deals made in the 
hot markets of the late 1980s had even higher default rates (Kaplan and Stein, 1993; Andrade 
and Kaplan 1998). In Strömberg (2008) for the whole period of 1970-2007, 6% of the 
recorded deals eventually filed for bankruptcy, went in a financial restructuring, or was 
reported to have gone out of business. The author notes that although strict conclusions 
cannot be drawn due to high amount of unknown exits, given the high leverage in these 
transactions, bankruptcy rates of LBOs seem relatively modest compared to average junk 
bond issuers. 
Strömberg (2008) also documents the timing of exits. The author finds that only 42% of the 
private equity funds’ investments are exited within the target of 5 years of the initial 
transaction. The median holding period is about 6 years. Accounting for secondary buyouts, 
the median time a single LBO stays in private equity ownership is around 9 years, which 
seems to have increased over time.4 However, it is important to note that due to the recent 
buyout boom that saw deal volumes increase dramatically, a large share of transactions have 
not been included in the existing literature. 
                                                 
4
 Kaplan (1991) found that accounting for SBOs the median LBO target remained in private ownership for 6.8 
years 
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2.3 The Nordic private equity industry 
Over the past 25 years, there has been tremendous growth in the private equity industry 
starting in the U.S. in the early 1980s, and later followed by the U.K. and other European 
markets. In the Nordics, late 1980s saw the first private equity firms in Sweden, while the 
other countries followed in the 1990s. 
At the height of the market in 2007, Nordic private equity investments accounted for 12% of 
total private equity investments in Europe, while accounting for only about 8% of GDP. In 
2010, Sweden had the highest amount of private equity investments as a % of GDP among 27 
European countries (0.78%), with Norway placing third (0.61%), Finland seventh (0.33%), 
and Denmark 17th (0.17%). Historically the Nordics have outperformed the rest of Europe in 
returns, which potentially have contributed to the relatively large size of the industry in the 
Nordics. (EVCA, 2010) 
In 2007-2009, nearly €13 billion was raised by Nordic buyout funds. Funds managed by 
Swedish private equity firms accounted for majority of the amount, 65%, while Norway, 
Finland and Denmark accounted for 14%, 13% and 8% of the total respectively (EVCA, 
2010). However, in the past 10 years many of the larger private equity firms have become 
multinational Scandinavian funds with wide investment scope. For example, the Swedish 
fund EQT has over 100 investment professionals in 13 offices around the world, including 
China and the U.S. 
Competition in the Nordic private equity market is intense especially in the small- and mid-
cap space due to the high amounts of committed capital and large number of individual 
private equity firms. Historically, the Nordics have had the high purchase multiples relative to 
other European markets. (EVCA, 2010) 
3 Literature review 
In the wake of public takeover wave of the 1980s, Jensen (1989) argued for superiority of 
private ownership. The author stated that a central source of waste in the public corporation is 
the conflict between owners and managers over free cash flow, which could be alleviated by 
“highly leveraged financial structures, pay- for-performance compensation systems, 
substantial equity ownership by managers and directors, and contracts with owners and 
creditors that limit both cross-subsidization among business units and the waste of free cash 
flow”.  
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Majority of the literature on leveraged buyout and private equity have concentrated on their 
ability to create financial and economic value. This chapter describes recent literature on 
value creation in the private equity context. First, I present the three levers for value creation. 
Then, I discuss the alternative explanations for financial value creation. Finally, I discuss 
cyclicality and financial distress costs in private equity and their implications on value 
creation. 
3.1 Three levers of value creation 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) divide theories of value creation in the context of leverage 
buyouts to three parts, which they call these levers of value creation. The following 
subsections discuss financial, governance, and operational engineering. 
3.1.1 Financial engineering 
Private equity funds’ use of significant financial leverage affects portfolio companies in two 
ways. The first effect is purely financial. Increasing leverage combined with tax deductibility 
of interest can potentially raise firm value by lowering weighted average cost of capital. The 
other effect is that it can reduce agency problems between ownership and shareholders by 
creating pressure on managers not to waste money.  
Firstly, leverage affects the firm value through tax deductibility of interest payments. 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) argue that the value of a leveraged company is the value of all-
equity financed company plus the value of tax shields. However, the value of tax shield to 
ultimate investors is difficult to calculate because it requires assumptions on shareholder’s 
personal taxes, long-term leverage, and uncertainty of the tax shield realizing in expected 
time. Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that optimal allocation between debt and equity is 
the point where marginal benefits equal marginal costs. If the leverage is too high, expected 
costs of financial distress can offset the benefits from the tax shield. 
The importance of tax shield in value creation is potentially high. Kaplan (1989a) studies the 
value of the tax shield in sample of 76 MBOs during the period 1980-1986. He found that the 
reduction in tax due to higher interest payments had a value of between 21% and 142.6% of 
the premium paid to the former shareholders.  Guo et al. (2011) find in their sample of 192 
public-to-private LBOs in the U.S. that tax benefit can account for 30% to 40% of total 
returns. However, they note that the magnitude of the impact depends heavily on assumptions 
on whether leverage will be maintained after the exit. For firms sold in secondary buyouts (for 
which maintaining leverage is a fair assumption), the increased tax benefits account for 29% 
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of the return to pre-LBO capital. Acharya, Hahn and Kehoe (2010) study 110 large deals by 
mature PE houses and find that 56% of average deal IRR comes from financial leverage. 
3.1.2 Governance engineering 
In addition to value of tax shields, finance literature recognizes two other main mechanism 
private equity firms use to reduce agency problems between owners and managers though 
improved corporate governance. First, the need for monitoring can be reduced by paying 
attention to management incentives. In addition, agency costs can be minimized by reducing 
monitoring costs through active ownership. 
Firstly, Jensen (1986) argues that managers have incentives to invest free cash flow at below 
the cost of capital or wasting it on organization inefficiencies. Hence, increasing leverage can 
help to reduce agency cost of free cash flow. Firstly, the necessity to make debt payments (as 
opposed to pay promised dividend) reduces the cash flow available for spending at the 
discretion of managers and motivates the organization to become more efficient.  Secondly, 
the high leverage increases monitoring of the company by limited partners who hold large 
fraction of equity, and creditors who have to be convinced to finance new projects. Numerous 
studies find support for Jensen’s theory.  
Cotter and Peck (2001), building on motivational force of high amount of debt,  argue that 
when LBOs are financed with more short-term and senior debt than with long-term and 
subordinate debt, debt is likely to play a more important role in monitoring and motivating 
managers in the post-LBO firm. Consistent with this, they find that LBOs where private 
equity firm controls the majority of are likely to be financed with less short-term and/or senior 
debt, and less likely to default. In LBOs where private equity firm is not involved, tighter debt 
terms increase LBO performance.  
Axelson et al. (2008) propose an explanation for the financial structure of private equity firms 
based on agency conflicts between the fund managers and investors. They argue that private 
equity funds are restricted on the amount they can invest in a single deal, requir ing the funds 
to use deal-by-deal debt financing which reduces incentives to make bad investments.  
Secondly, private equity model can add value through their concentrated ownership and 
ensuing control over boards of the portfolio companies, and through active involvement in 
governance processes. According to literature, private equity portfolio companies have 
smaller boards than comparable public companies (Cornelli and Karakas, 2011), which can 
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have a positive impact on company value (Yermack, 1996). In addition, private equity firm 
have greater board representation on smaller boards, suggesting that they actively monitor 
managers (Acharya et al., 2010). 
Studies have also shown that private equity firms often make changes to management.  
Acharya et al. (2010) find that that 38% of the CEOs of portfolio companies will be replaced 
within 100 days, 69% at some point of the time. Guo et al. (2011) report 37%  CEO 
replacement rate, and show that improvements are greater when the CEO is replaced at the 
time of the buyout, consistent with Acharya et al. (2010).  
Finally, private equity firms typically give the management team a large equity upside with 
stock ownership and options, a practice that was not common in public corporations before 
the 1990s. However, unlike public companies, private equity firms have traditionally required 
management to make a substantial investment in the company, generating a significant 
downside that potentially has higher motivational power than option-based compensation 
schemes. Moreover, as the management’s equity investment in a portfolio company is illiquid  
and typically has a relatively long investment horizon, it can reduce myopic investment 
decisions and stock-price manipulation. 
High managerial ownership after LBO has been conducted suggests that management 
incentives might play a significant role in leveraged buyouts. Kaplan (1989a) finds that the 
equity holdings of the management team increase from a median of 5.9% to 22.6% in a 
sample of public-to-private MBOs. Leslie and Oyer (2008) report that an average CEO has 
68% higher equity stake than a comparable public company manager. Kaplan and Strömberg 
(2008) find that in their sample of 43 U.S. LBOs during the period 1996-2004 (of which 23 
were public-to-private) CEO receives 5.4% of equity upside, while management team as a 
whole gets 16%. Guo et al. (2011) find that in their sample 62% of times management buys 
some fraction of equity in a public-to-private transaction. In deals where detailed information 
was available, management team contributes on average 12.8% of the equity. Similarly, 
Acharya et al. (2010) find that on average 14.3% of ordinary equity is being employed for 
incentive purposes. 
While increased managerial incentives is often cited as one of the key drivers of value 
creation, some recent studies have questioned the view. Leslie and Oyer (2008) argue that 
public corporations may have adopted some of the practices from private equity firms over 
the years.  Using a sample of 144 reverse LBOs from 1996 to 2004, they find no significant 
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improvement in performance, and show that the compensation and debt differences between 
PE-owned companies and public companies disappear over a very short after the PE-owned 
firm goes public. 5 
Acharya et al. (2010) find an inverse relation between top abnormal performance deals and 
the high cash multiples in management compensation. The authors argue that there are two 
possible interpretations. First, replacement of management in the early phase increases 
performance, but providing them with strong equity-based incentives and requiring them to 
co-invest does not; or alternatively, strong incentives are provided because weaker incentives 
would result in even lower performance. That is, the worst deals are so risky that strong 
incentive provision required to attract good managers and improve performance fails to 
improve these deals substantially enough to push their performance above that of other deals. 
3.1.3 Operational engineering 
Jensen (1989) argued that value in LBOs is created through high leverage and powerful 
incentives. However, in the past 10 years, focus has shifted from financial and governance 
engineering to operational improvements. Most top private equity firms are nowadays 
organized around industries, and use internal expertise groups or consulting firms to identify 
attractive investment opportunities (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). In practice, operational 
engineering involves large up front investments in due diligence and strategic initiatives. At 
the time of investment, private equity firms already have developed a plan that considers cost-
cutting opportunities, strategic changes and repositioning, and both organic and inorganic 
growth opportunities. In general, operational engineering is oriented to increasing profitability 
and cash flows.  
 Evidence is consistent with top, mature private equity creating financial value through 
operational improvements (Cumming et al. 2007). However, studies on the relationship of 
human capital and value creation are limited. Acharya et al. (2010) tries to fill this gap by 
studying a sample of 110 LBOs conducted by mature private equity firms. They find that 
general partners with operational background generate significantly higher outperformance in 
organic deals, while partners with financial background generate higher returns in inorganic 
                                                 
5
 A reverse leveraged buyout occurs when either a publicly t raded firm or a d ivision within one converts to 
private ownership via a leveraged buyout and subsequently goes public. 
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deals6. Cressy et al. (2007b) find that industry specialization of PE firm has positive impact on 
profitability improvement.  
3.2 Other theories 
3.2.1 Undervaluation of buyout target 
Lowenstein (1985) argues that management of buyout targets has information that is not 
available to other bidders that they potentially use to gain private benefits. Moreover, 
managers could use specific accounting techniques to depress the share price. This 
undervaluation or private information hypothesis could explain the improvements in 
operating performance post-buyout especially in management buyouts. On the other hand, 
also leveraged buyouts by private equity firms could benefit from incumbent management’s 
inside information, if better incentives and monitoring lead to better use of management’s 
knowledge of the firm to deliver better results (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). 
Some concerns have been expressed about accounting measures around the time of buyouts. 
Wu (1997) finds evidence of earnings management MBOs in the 1980s. Perry and Williams 
(1994) find that managers of buyout targets use discretionary accruals to manage earnings 
downward in the year preceding a management buyout. However, DeAnglo (1986) find no 
indication that managers systematically understate earnings in period before a MBO. Due to 
stricter accounting principles and disclosure requirements in the 2000s, it is fair to conclude 
that earnings management probably plays a minor role in potential undervaluation.  
Renneboog et al. (2007) find evidence consistent with undervaluation hypothesis. They 
identify a strong negative relation between pre-transaction price performance and the price 
premium paid in MBOs and IBOs, which mostly retain part of the incumbent management, 
whereas the relationship is insignificant for MBIs. Weir et al. (2005) find that find that 
perceived undervaluation can lead to higher occurrence of MBOs, but using a more accurate 
objective measure leads to insignificant results. 
Kaplan (1989a) finds that forecasts of future cash flows at the time of the buyout are actually 
lower than actual post-buyout realizations, which should be the opposite if private 
information hypothesis stands. Lee (1992) studies stock price performance of withdrawn 
MBOs, and finds no evidence in support of MBOs revealing inside information about firm 
                                                 
6
 The authors define organic deal as a deal where major M&A does not happen, i.e. deals that concentrate more 
on operational improvements in the target company 
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value. Ofek (1994) studies both stock price and operational performance and finds no 
evidence of improvement in firms with unsuccessful MBOs, suggesting that efficiency gains 
are more likely to come from organizational changes than private information, as in this case 
the improvements would have occurred regardless of the deal success. 
If private information were a prime motivational factor for buyouts, one would expect 
management turnover to be low, and those deals where incumbent management remains in 
their seats experience higher returns. However, evidence does not support this. Acharya et al. 
(2010) find that 38% of deals have CEO replaced during the first 100 days, and higher 
abnormal return for those deals, especially in organic deals. Similarly, Guo et al. (2009/2011) 
find that in 37% of deals CEO was replaced within the first year and that cash flow 
performance is greater for these deals. 
3.2.2 Target selection and market timing 
While evidence is inconsistent with operating improvements being the result of information 
asymmetries between incumbent managers and shareholders, recent studies have found large 
financial gains combined with modest improvements in operating performance, suggesting 
that private equity firms are able to buy cheap and sell high. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) 
argue that the evidence is potentially consistent with private equity firms’ better negotiating 
skills, leading them to pay lower price than other firms (Bargeron et al., 2008) or private 
equity investors taking advantage of market timing.  
 Guo et al. (2011) find that significant portion of the positive average returns are likely due to 
changes in market conditions rather than to firm specific changes while private. They find 
average increase of 1.08 in EBITDA multiple, and attribute 18% of returns to pre-buyout 
capital to changes in industry valuation multiples. Similarly, Acharya et al. (2010) find 
average multiple improvement of 1.9. 
However, Acharya et al. (2009) argue that better matching could explain the puzzle of huge 
financial performance compared to moderate or no operational outperformance. They find 
that compared to overall sector benchmarking, peer matching lowers the financial 
outperformance of PE deals and increases their operational outperformance by roughly one-
third.  
Expansion of valuation multiples can also be explained by credit market conditions. 
Demiroglu and James (2010) find that LBOs sponsored by reputable private equity firms are 
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able to acquire cheaper financing than other LBOs. By taking on large amounts of cheaply 
priced debt, firms can lower their cost of capital and therefore increase their valuation 
multiple. The following sub-section discusses market conditions and timing in more detail 
and its implications to cyclicality in buyout activity. 
3.2.3 Cyclicality and impact of downturns 
As discussed previously, private equity industry is highly cyclical in terms of deal activity and 
fundraising. Academic studies suggest that cyclicality is closely linked to availability of debt 
financing, leading to higher volumes, greater use of leverage, higher valuations, and 
ultimately higher probability of defaults for deals executed at the top of the cycle. 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) argue that private equity firms take advantage of the difference 
between relative cost of debt compared to cost of equity in certain points of time. They find 
that the difference between the earnings yield in the S&P 500 index and the high-yield rate at 
the time of the buyout is positively related to fund inflows. Consistent with this, Axelson et 
al. (2010) find significant positive relationship between leverage and the ease of debt market 
conditions, measured in differences between earnings yield and the high-yield rate at the time 
of the buyout, and non-price aspects of credit market conditions, such as debt covenants and 
quantity constraints. 
Availability of leverage is also associated with higher valuation levels.  Kaplan and Stein 
(1993) find that favorable market conditions contributed to the buyout wave and increased 
valuations in the 1980s. Ljungqvist et al. (2008) find that established funds accelerate their 
investment flows when credit market conditions loosen. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) argue 
related to the mispricing hypothesis that rate spreads could account as much as 10% of the 
purchase price, or alternatively, allow private equity firms to pay 10% more for their targets.  
Thus, relatively more deals will be undertaken when debt markets are unusually favorable, 
and deals undertaken during favorable conditions could earn higher returns if the competition 
between buyout funds is not strong enough. Lower premiums paid in club deals support the 
idea that such market inefficiencies are possible (Officer et al. 2010).  
Axelson et al. (2010) present an agency-based theory for cyclicality. They argue that debt and 
related monitoring activities work as a tool to reduce negative NPV investments that might 
otherwise be optimal for the general partners due to the option- like incentive structure that 
emphasizes upside. When external financers see investment opportunities overly favorable, 
deal activity increases, and deals underperform those made in strict market conditions. Thus, 
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in contrast to the mispricing hypothesis, agency theory predicts that increased use of leverage 
can deteriorate returns of funds. 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) find strong negative relation between fundraising and aggregate 
returns over the next 10-12 years. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find that funds raised in boom 
times are less likely to raise follow-on funds, suggesting poor subsequent performance. They 
argue that dilution of aggregate performance is driven by the poor performance of new 
entrants, as performance of established funds is less affected.  Kaplan and Stein (1993) 
attribute the increased default rates of deals made in the booming LBO market of 1980s to 
reckless pricing and poorly designed capital and incentive structures. 
Bernstein et al. (2010) investigate effect of private equity to industries with heavy buyout 
activity. If firms completing buyouts at market peaks employ leverage excessively, one would 
expect industries with heavy buyout activity to experience more intense subsequent 
downturns.  However, private equity backed firms may actually outperform in downturns.   
First, due to their sponsor’s ability to provide equity financing that might be unavailable for 
other companies during downturns. PE funds have extraordinary liquidity during downturns, 
due to the commitments raised in the preceding market peak. Thus, PE-backed companies 
could have financial flexibility that leads to fewer bankruptcies in challenging economic 
conditions. Second, Jensen (1989) argues that high levels of debt forces early and intense 
response to negative shocks. Thus, high leverage entailed in buyout transactions could push 
portfolio companies to react more quickly to downturns, leading to better performance in 
adverse economic conditions than their less- levered peers. Bernstein et al. (2010) find no 
evidence that economic activity in industries with high PE activity is more exposed to 
aggregate shocks. 
If private equity backed firms are able to better adjust in adverse shocks, the underlying 
operations can be in better shape than their peers. Thus, even if many end up in financial 
distress, the outcome can be relatively good due to efficient restructuring. Andrade and 
Kaplan (1998) find that the net effect of LBO and distress in the 1980s was on average 
slightly positive. Even distressed buyouts created value. Guo et al. (2011) find that large 
portion of Chapter 11 restructurings in their sample are “pre-packaged” bankruptcies, 
suggesting that the resolution of distress via Chapter 11 may not be costly for these firms.  
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3.3 Empirical evidence 
This section presents an overview of empirical evidence on real and financial returns of 
buyouts. The section is divided to four sub-sections based on the type of study. First, I present 
the evidence on operating performance and productivity gains on a portfolio company level, 
which largely relies on accounting measures at the portfolio company level. Second, I present 
the closely related evidence on employment effects of buyouts. The last two sub-sections 
present empirical evidence financial performance; first recent deal- level studies on financial 
performance and then, finally, fund-level studies. 
To some extent, distinctions between different types of buyouts and transactions can cause a 
problem. Some studies treat all buyouts as a single group, while some distinguish between 
LBOs and MBOs, MBIs and IBOs. Moreover, many of the studies are limited to public-to-
private transactions. However, many of the drivers of value creation are similar in all types of 
buyouts, and in many cases results should be directionally consistent, although magnitude can 
vary. 
3.3.1 Operational performance 
As summarized by Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) and Cumming et al. (2007), there seems to 
be a general consensus that LBOs enhance performance of companies. However, the more 
recent public-to-private transactions could be an exception. Guo et al. (2011) find that gains 
in operating performance are not significantly different from those observed for benchmark 
firms in their sample of 94 U.S. public-to-private transactions completed between 1990 and 
2006.  For a similar sample, Leslie and Oyer (2008) find genera lly no evidence for greater 
profitability or operating efficiency. Consistent with the U.S. evidence, Weir et al. (2007) find 
in their sample of 122 U.K. public-to-private transactions between 1998 and 2004 limited 
evidence for modest improvements in operating performance.  Table 1 presents relevant 
recent studies on profitability and cash flows. 
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 Table 1 – Previous findings on the impact of buyouts on profitability 
Author/ year 
of study 
Country/ 
period 
Sample Findings 
Kaplan (1989a) U.S.  
1980-1986 
76 PTPs Change in EBIT/sales and EBIT/assets exceed industry 
median by approximately 20% in first three years after the 
buyout  
Smith (1990) U.S. 
1977-1986 
58 MBOs EBIT/assets increase 3-6 percentage points compared to 
industry benchmark 
Cressy et al. 
(2007b) 
U.K. 
1995-2002 
122 PE-
backed 
buyouts 
Over the first 3 post-buyout years ROA is greater than 
those of comparable companies by 4.5% 
Weir et al. 
(2008) 
U.K. 
1998-2004 
122 PTPs Firms do not perform worse than firms that remain public 
and some evidence that performance improves. PE-backed 
deals performed better than the industry average and no 
worse than non-PE deals 
Leslie and Oyer 
(2008) 
U.S.  
1996-2006 
144 
Reverse 
LBOs 
No evidence that PE-owned firms are substantially more 
successful than comparable public firms in operating 
metrics such as ROA, operating income, or headcount 
Acharya et al. 
(2010) 
W. Europe 
1995-2005 
110 PE-
backed 
buiyouts 
EBITDA/sales change on average 2.1 percentage points 
above sector benchmark 
Guo et al. 
(2011) 
U.S. 
1990-2006 
94 PTPs Gains in EBITDA/sales and EBITDA/assets either 
comparable to or slightly exceeded those observed for 
industry benchmark 
 
Due to limited published research on private-to-private buyouts, no clear picture can be 
constructed from the whole universe of leveraged buyouts. General problem with the studies 
is that only public-to-private deals are included, and benchmark group includes only public 
companies.  
3.3.2 Employment effects 
Improvements in operating performance are closely related to employment in portfolio 
companies. Shleifer and Summers (1988) suggest that buyouts and takeovers transfer wealth 
to investors by laying-off employees or reducing their wages. As cost-cutting is a major 
potential source for operational efficiency, critics have argued that private equity’s impact for 
the economy as a whole can be less positive if the value is gained at the expense of 
employees. In addition to the streamlining view, some studies have investigated changes to 
overall working environment.  Table 2 presents recent studies on employment effects of 
buyouts. 
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Table 2 – Previous findings on the impact of buyouts on employment 
Author/ year 
of study 
Country/ 
period 
Findings 
Kaplan (1989a) U.S. 
1980-1986 
Employment increased post-buyout, but by less than other companies in 
the industry 
Lichtenberg 
and 
Siegel (1990) 
U.S. 
1981-1986 
Plants involved in LBOs and MBOs are more productive than 
comparable plants before the buyout. Employment and wages of white-
collar workers at plants (but not blue-collar workers) declines after an 
LBO or MBO 
Bruining et al. 
(2005) 
U.K., 
Holland 
1992-1998 
MBOs lead to increases in levels of employment and wages 
Harris, Siegel, 
and 
Wright (2005) 
U.K. 
1982-1998 
Plants involved in MBOs are less productive before the buyout,  but  
substantially increase productivity and reduce employment after a 
buyout 
Amess and 
Wright 
(2007) 
U.K. 
1999-2004 
Taken together LBOs have an insignificant effect on employment 
growth but have significantly lower wage growth than non-LBOs. 
Employment grows in MBOs but falls in MBIs after buyout 
Cressy et al. 
(2007a) 
U.K. 
1995-2000 
PE-backed companies’ employment falls relative to controls by 23% 
over the first 4 post-buyout years. In the fifth year employment 
increases. Buyouts generating higher operating profits from job cuts are 
associated with compensating job creation. 
Davis et al. 
(2008) 
U.S. 
1980-2005 
Post-buyout, employment at buyout companies increased at a lower rate 
than at other companies in the same. However, for new establishments, 
buyout companies had higher job growth than similar non-buyout 
companies. The authors were not able to determine the net effect. 
Amess, Girma, 
and Wright 
(2008) 
U.K. 
1996-2006 
PE-backed leveraged buyouts had no significant impact on either wages 
or employment. Other LBOs and traditional caused a decline in 
employment. 
Weir, Jones 
and Wright 
(2008) 
U.K. 
1998-2004 
PE-backed PTPs incurred job losses each year while non-PE PTPs 
increased employment after the first year post-deal 
 
For the earlier buyouts, Kaplan (1989b) finds that employment increased after the transaction, 
but at slower rate than other companies in the industry. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) 
investigate plant- level data and find that employment and compensation of white-collar 
workers declined following buyouts, but those of blue-collar workers remained unchanged.  
Bruining et al. (2005) find that management buyouts result in higher levels of employment, 
employee empowerment, and wages. These effects were found to be stronger in the U.K. than 
in Holland. Cressy et al. (2007a) find significant decrease in employment after a private 
equity backed buyout. However, the initial period of rationalization created opportunity for 
more sustainable job creation. 
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Davis et al. (2008) study employment with a comprehensive sample of U.S. buyouts at the 
level of firm and establishment (i.e., specific factories, offices, retail outlets and other distinct 
physical locations where business takes place). They find that employment growth in control 
group outstripped growth at target establishments after and, interestingly, before the 
transaction. Although post-buyout job creation is similar to the control group, job destruction 
is substantially larger. However, greenfield job creation is significantly higher in target firms 
post-buyout, thus at least partly offsetting the job losses in existing establishments. The 
authors were unable to determine the net effect of the greenfield job creation and destruction 
in existing establishments. 
Amess et al. (2008) conduct an extensive analysis of 1350 U.K. LBOs and find that when 
LBOs are disaggregated, employment growth is 0.51 of a percentage point higher for insider-
driven MBOs after the change in ownership and 0.81 of a percentage point lower for outsider-
driven MBIs. This suggests that motivations for outsider-driven LBOs are different, often 
involving significant restructuring. 
Overall, although strict conclusions on effect of leveraged buyouts on employment and wages 
cannot be drawn, recent literature suggests that in general employment growth in leveraged 
buyouts lags growth in comparable companies. However, it seems that insider-driven buyouts 
potentially have positive effect on employment, productivity and work practices; outsider-
driven (including private equity backed) LBOs potentially have negative effects on 
employment in the first years after the buyout. 
3.3.3 Firm-level financial performance 
Evidence from buyouts in the 1980s suggests that buyouts do have a significant effect on 
target companies’ financial performance, measured in both share price and accounting data. 
Since then, many of the studies have been made in Europe and especially U.K. due to stricter 
disclosure requirements for private companies.  Table 3 presents recent deal- level studies on 
financial performance of buyouts.  
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Table 3 – Previous findings on firm-level financial performance 
Author/ year 
of study 
Country/ 
period 
Sample Findings 
Renneboog et al. 
(2007) 
U.K. 
1997-2003 
177 PTPs Main sources of the shareholder wealth gains are 
undervaluation of the pre-transaction target firm, increased 
interest tax shields and incentive realignment 
Nikoskelainen 
and Wright 
(2007) 
U.K. 
1995-2004 
321 
LBOs 
Larger buyouts perform better and provide higher investor 
returns. Equity returns in PE-backed buyouts are positively 
impacted by divestments. 
Cao and Lerner 
(2009) 
U.S. 
1981-2003 
526 
Reverse 
LBOs 
IPOs of companies that have were previously bought by 
private equity firms and subsequently brought back to 
market outperform other IPOs and the whole market 
Acharya et al. 
(2010) 
W. Europe 
1995-2005 
110 PE-
backed 
buiyouts 
Abnormal performance is significantly positive on average. 
Higher abnormal performance is related to greater 
improvement in EBITDA to sales ratio (margin) and greater 
growth in EBITDA multiple, relative to those of quoted 
peers. Deals that focus exclusively on organic value 
creation programs improve margins, while deals with an 
M&A focus grow EBITDA multiples more substantially. 
General partners with an operational background generate 
significantly higher outperformance in organic deals. In 
contrast, general partners with a background in finance 
generate higher outperformance in deals with M&A events. 
Guo et al. 
(2011) 
U.S. 
1990-2006 
94 PTPs Median market- and risk-adjusted returns to pre- buyout 
(post-buyout) capital invested are 72.5% (40.9%). Increases 
in industry valuation multiples and realized tax benefits 
from increasing leverage, while private, are each 
economically as important as operating gains in explaining 
realized returns. 
 
Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) present evidence concerning returns from exited buyouts 
and their determinants. They present two relevant findings. First, larger buyouts perform 
better and provide higher investor returns. The authors argue that large corporations are less 
vulnerable to short-term shocks due to diversification effects, and support from the financial 
sponsor due to the relative importance of larger portfolio companies. For the very same 
reason, one would expect the sponsor to put more effort on assistance and guidance for these 
companies. Second, the authors find no evidence that MBI return values would be impacted 
by acquisitions. Instead, MBI equity returns are positively impacted by divestments. Thus, the 
results indicate that private equity firms are able to drive their returns through streamlining of 
target company operations. 
Acharya et al. (2010) study a sample of 110 medium- and large-size LBOs in U.K. and 
Western Europe. They separate deals with organic strategies from those deals that involved 
major M&A events during the private phase. They find that for organic deals, EBITDA 
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margin improvements explain abnormal performance, but multiple improvements do not. 
Conversely, for inorganic deals, abnormal performance is explained by multiple 
improvements but not margin improvements. The authors find that general partners with 
operational background generate significantly higher outperformance in organic deals, while 
partners with financial background generate higher returns in inorganic deals. Cressy et al. 
(2007b) find evidence consistent with the view that experience and specialization has an 
effect on operational performance of the target company. 
Guo et al. (2011) find industry and stock market adjusted investor returns that are on average 
large and positive at the portfolio company level. Increases in operating performance and in 
industry valuation multiples each account for approximately third of returns. 
Although there seems to be uniform view that LBOs enhance performance, some concerns 
have been highlighted in the existing literature. First, some authors have questioned the long-
run economic effect of buyouts, as the limited investment horizon and high debt-pressure 
could create incentives to inflate short-term cash flows on the expense of longer-term value. 
Moreover, due to the increased equity ownership, managers might have incentives to 
manipulate earnings downward prior LBO and upward before exit7. In contrast to this view, 
Cao and Lerner (2009) provide evidence that IPOs of companies that have were previously 
bought by private equity firms and subsequently brought back to market outperform other 
IPOs and the whole market. 
Second, many of the studies are subject to some degree of selection bias. Especially in the 
U.S., studies have been limited to public companies or companies that hold public debt, as 
private firms are largely exempt from public disclosure requirements. Many studies have 
relied on companies that have subsequently experienced an IPO, which happens in only about 
one-eighth of the cases (Strömberg, 2008). Moreover, another source of selection bias arises 
from studies looking at only realized investments. The full effect of the latest LBO wave, 
which accounted for a significant share of all-time LBO volume, is largely unknown. 
Many studies may also fail to take in the full effect of defaulted investments. Kaplan and 
Stein (1993) argue that many of the deals made in the booming LBO market of 1980s were 
recklessly priced and structured, and lead to high default rates. They find that 22 of 83 of the 
deals between 1985 had defaulted by August 1991. The authors attribute the increased default 
                                                 
7
 Wu (1997) shows earnings manipulat ion in  87 management buyouts during 1980–1987. Chou et al. (2006) find 
positive and significant discretionary current accruals coincident with offerings of reverse LBOs 
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rates to poorly designed capital and incentive structures. Jensen (1991) that regulatory shocks 
and a downturn in the overall economy also played a role. However, Andrade and Kaplan 
(1998) find that for U.S. buyouts that defaulted, the leveraged buyout companies retained 
approximately the same value they had obtained before the buyout. 
3.3.4 Fund-level financial performance 
Although evidence suggests value creation at portfolio company level, returns to investors are 
deteriorated by price premium paid to target shareholders, and fees paid to private equity 
firms. Studies have shown that private equity firms pay an average premium of about 30% in 
public to private transactions (Renneboog et al., 2007; Bargeron et al., 2008). Moreover, a 
typical private equity fund pays out about one-fifth of the committed capital as fees (Metrick 
and Yasuda, 2010b).  
In addition to the benefit of being net-of- fees, fund- level studies are better than deal- level 
studies in assessing performance of private-to-private buyouts, thus giving a more complete 
view of the performance of the whole buyout population. However, aggregation at the fund 
level and lack of information about the timing of cash flows cause problems in many fund-
level studies.  
Research of fund-level returns faces two primary challenges. First, cash flow data is 
confidential, and is not easily accessible. Second, because investments are illiquid and 
individual deal returns are realized only at the time of the exit, measurement of risk is 
practically impossible. Thus, calculation of abnormal returns suffers from methodological 
difficulties. (Metrick and Yasuda, 2010b) 
Table 4 – Previous findings on fund-level financial performance 
Author/year 
of study 
Period Fund 
type 
Findings 
Ljungqvist and 
Richardson 
(2003) 
1981-
1993 
VC and 
Buyout 
Excess returns of about 5-8% per annum relative to S&P 500 
depending on assumption 
Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005) 
1980-
2001 
VC and 
Buyout 
Average fund returns overperforming gross-of-fees, returns net 
of fees are slightly less than S&P 500. Returns persist strongly 
across subsequent funds of a single private equity firm. 
Phalippou and 
Gottschalg 
(2009) 
1980-
2003 
VC and 
Buyout 
Average net-of-fees fund performance of 3% per year below that 
of the S&P 500. Adjusting for risk brings the underperformance 
to 6% per year. 
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Kaplan and Schoar (2005) use fund-by-fund VC and LBO data from 169 funds that are either 
U.S.-based or U.S.- focused to compare the fund performance net of fees to Standard & Poor´s 
500 index.  Although their data is subject to selection bias as it is collected on voluntary basis, 
the data allows for cross-sectional comparison between the funds to identify a number of 
characteristics that affect fund returns. The authors find that average fund returns net of fees 
are slightly less than S&P 500, although large heterogeneity in performance across funds 
exists; returns persist strongly across subsequent funds of a single private equity firm, and 
better performing firms are more likely to raise follow-on funds and larger funds.  
Phalippou and Gottschlag (2009) include the same funds as Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and 
add non-U.S. funds to the final sample of 314 funds. They restrict their investigation to 
liquidated funds and make adjustments for timing of cash flows, selection bias, and risk. Their 
results are largely in line with Kaplan and Schoar (2005), with similar return persistence and 
leveraged buyouts underperforming S&P 500 net-of- fees, and overperforming gross-of- fees. 
Average investor returns for buyouts vis-à-vis venture capital funds are significantly higher. 
Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) use data obtained from a single private equity investor, and 
find excess returns of about 5-8% per annum relative to S&P 500 depending on assumption. 
Phalippou and Gottschlag (2009) argue that the difference could arise from differences in 
sample. Funds in Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) sample are larger, more U.S. focused, 
and more experienced, which are all found to be characteristics that correlate positively with 
performance (Cumming and Waltz, 2009; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). Moreover, Lerner, 
Schoar and Wong (2007) have shown that some investor types have consistently earned 
higher returns on their private equity investments than other limited partners. 
Measurement and reporting of fund returns are potential to numerous biases and 
shortcomings. Firstly, Cumming and Waltz (2009) show that private equity fund managers 
may report inflated accounting-based valuation for non-exited investments. Secondly, Groh 
and Gottschalg (2006) perform a sensitivity analysis that highlights the importance of risk 
adjustments and assumptions for operating and leverage risk when benchmarking returns to 
indices. Thirdly, assumptions on timing of cash flows and management fee basis can have a 
significant impact on net-of- fees returns. Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) show that in their 
sample, moving from 2% to 2.5% in management fees translates into 1.3% decrease in alpha. 
This is explained by management fee being calculated on committed capital instead of 
invested capital basis. 
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Overall, evidence from fund- level returns is consistent with firm-level evidence in the sense 
that private equity on average creates value. However, much of this value seem to fall in the 
hands of general partners in form of fees (Metrick and Yasuda, 2007; Phalippou and 
Gottschalg, 2009). Due to issues with data availability and resulting potential biases, the 
evidence is not conclusive on whether private equity on average creates value for investors. 
However, there seems to be a general consensus that top private equity funds are able to 
persistently overperform, which has enabled them subsequently to raise larger funds. 
4 Hypotheses 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine operational performance of private equity backed 
companies that were acquired before the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The hypotheses are 
divided into three sub-groups. First, I study performance of portfolio companies compared to 
a benchmark group, trying to establish a link between abnormal performance and private 
equity ownership. Then, a regression analysis is conducted on determinants of abnormal 
performance to gain knowledge on the factors that potentially affect the results. 
4.1 Operating performance 
On the basis of the theories and previous empirical findings (see Table 1), I expect buyouts 
conducted by private equity firms to lead to improved operating performance also in the 
recession period. 
H1: Profitability of buyouts companies is improved relative to their respective peer group 
As discussed in Chapter 3, private equity firms employ a set of changes in the portfolio 
company which potentially influence the operating performance. Shleifer and Summers 
(1988) suggest that buyouts may lead to transfer of wealth from employees to investors by 
laying-off employees or reducing their wages. Moreover, Jensen (1989) argues that high 
levels of debt forces early and intense response to negative shocks. Thus, I expect to see more 
intense decrease in wage levels and reduction of the labor force in the buyout companies 
compared to their peers. Additionally, I expect sales per employee to increase relative to peers 
if PE-companies are able to streamline their operations faster. 
H2: Personnel costs in relation to sales decrease in buyout companies compared to their 
respective peer group 
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H3: Personnel costs in relation to amount of employees decrease in buyout companies 
compared to their respective peer group 
H4: Sales per employee increase in buyout companies compared to their respective peer 
group 
Private equity firms commonly initiate restructuring programs to increase capital efficiency in 
the buyout firms. One of the key items in these programs is reduction of working capital, i.e. 
lowering inventory levels or accounts receivables, or negotiating better terms with suppliers. 
In line with Smith (1990), I expect relative increase in working capital turnover in portfolio 
companies. 
H5: Net working capital/sales decreases in the buyout companies compared to their 
respective peer group 
To understand whether the potential change in working capital is attributable to internal or 
external factors, I break it down to receivables, payables, and inventory turnover. 
H5.1: Receivables/sales decreases in the buyout companies compared to their respective 
peer group 
H5.2: Payables/sales increases in the buyout companies compared to their respective peer 
group 
H5.3: Stock/sales decreases in the buyout companies compared to their respective peer 
group 
4.2 Determinants of abnormal performance 
By definition, leveraged buyouts increase leverage in the target companies. According to 
Jensen (1986), increase in leverage reduces agency cost of free cash flow. Thus, I expect the 
increase in debt levels to lead to an improved operating performance. 
H6: Higher leverage is associated with higher abnormal operating performance 
The effect of secondary buyouts on operating performance has drawn increasing attention in 
the last years, but limited research on the subject has been published, due to the limitations 
inherent in buyout studies. According to the theory, private equity firms create value by 
financial, governance, and operational engineering. Moreover, private equity firms tend to 
target companies that underperform. If the initial private equity owner has already utilized the 
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levers, one would expect secondary buyouts to be more focused on financial value creation 
than operational improvements. Thus, I believe that primary buyouts will show a larger 
operating improvement than secondary buyouts.  
H7: Primary buyouts show higher abnormal operating performance than secondary 
buyouts 
In addition, I study the employment and working capital hypotheses in relation to the 
abnormal performance. Decrease in company- level personnel costs and working capital are 
potentially associated with higher levels of abnormal performance. Especially asset scaled 
profitability should respond to decrease in net working capital. 
H8: Decrease in Personnel costs/sales leads to higher abnormal operating performance 
H9: Decrease in Net Working Capital/sales leads to higher abnormal operating 
performance 
5 Data and Methodology 
This chapter presents the data and discusses the choices on methodology applied. I begin by 
presenting the general theory of performance measurement and practice in previous studies. 
Next, I present the methodology applied, including choices on event window, peer group 
matching technique, and studied variables. Then, I present the statistical methods deployed in 
the analysis. The final two sections describe the explanatory model applied and accounting 
variables used in the analysis. 
5.1 Sample selection 
This section discusses the choices on study period and selection criteria for the sample of 
buyouts. 
5.1.1 Study period 
Previous studies on operating performance use various methods to detect abnormal 
performance for the buyout event. Some studies compare the performance in the first years 
after the buyout to the pre-buyout performance (e.g. Kaplan, 1989a) while value creation 
studies often compare pre-buyout levels to the end of the holding period (e.g. Guo et al., 
2011).  
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Definition of the event window is highly dependent on the purpose of the study and data 
availability. Firstly, if the purpose of the study is to detect the effect of operational 
engineering and strategic changes, the first year or two after the buyout is the most critical 
period, and longer event window could only increase variation in the results. When studying 
value creation at the firm-level, the whole holding period has to be included in the study. 
Secondly, data availability can differ widely across companies and deal types. In studies of 
public-to-private transactions, accurate and whole pre-buyout financials are readily available, 
as opposed to divisional and other private-to-private buyouts, where, if available, financials 
may not fully reflect the operations and financing of the company as its own separate entity. 
Purpose of this thesis is to study the performance of Nordic private equity backed firms in 
downturn. All sample countries entered the negative growth period in the late 2008. GDP 
weighed decline in aggregate growth rate started already in 2007, and continued until second 
quarter of 2009. OECD Composite Leading Indicators signal that the slowdown started 
already in the second half of 2007. Figure 4 shows the aggregate key economic indicators for 
the sample countries. 
Figure 4 – Real GDP change and OECD Composite Leading Indicators 2005-2010 
The figure reports seasonally adjusted growth rate of real gross domestic product compared to the 
same quarter of previous year, and normalized OECD composite leading indicators in the period 2005-
2010. Reported values are GDP weighed averages of the country specific values for Sweden, Norway, 
Finland and Denmark. Source: OECD  
 
The period 2007-2009 was chosen as the main period under study, as these years cover the 
whole period of slowing economy. Accordingly, to be included in the sample initial 
investment in the portfolio company had to be made between 1.1.2005 and 30.6.2007. 
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While it could be feasible to include companies that were acquired already before 2005, I 
chose to leave these out for two reasons. First, as argued before, operating impact should be 
highest for recently acquired companies. Second, recent literature has suggested that many of 
the buyouts made in the recent buyout boom were motivated by low cost of debt rather than 
opportunities for creation of economic value in form of operational improvements. However, 
using recently acquired companies does not allow for isolation of the effect of recession from 
general improvement in operational performance. Thus, it is hard to say if the increases in 
operational performance are attributable to superior performance of the PE model in downturn 
specifically. 
5.1.2 Buyout sample and selection criteria 
Process of identifying buyouts by private equity firms started with acquiring all deals 
classified as institutional buyouts8, where target nation is either Denmark, Sweden, Finland or 
Norway, and announced or completed date is between 1.1.2005 and 30.6.2007. Combining 
the deal data and member registries of national venture capital associations, a list of private 
equity firms was formed for additional searches to identify missing and misclassified deals. 
Deals backed by financial sponsors that could be classified as family offices, public 
institutions, and private investment companies were excluded based on information provided 
by associations and on company web pages. After obtaining the initial deal sample and list of 
private equity firms, the list of deals was transformed to a list of portfolio companies and 
complemented with data from web pages of private equity firms. 
After obtaining the initial sample of portfolio companies, searches were conducted in Orbis 
database and national trade registries 9  to match names of the portfolio companies to 
corresponding financial entities. In most of the cases the operating company is acquired by a 
holding company, which assumes the acquisition debt. Thus, it is imperative to identify the 
ultimate parent of each of the operating companies at each year under study were identified to 
obtain proper balance sheet data for the whole financial entity. All of the post-acquisition 
entities were identified, while for 10 portfolio companies acquired in divisional buyout pre-
acquisition financial entity could not been identified. 
                                                 
8
 Zephyr defines institution buyout as an acquisition where a Private Equity or Venture Capital firm has taken 
the majority stake, or is the parent of the bidder company. Most of the deals often denoted MBOs are defined on 
Zephyr as IBOs due to the fact that the management team does not take a majority stake in the target company  
9
 http://www.brreg.no/ for Norway, http://www.cvr.dk/ fo r Denmark, http://www.bolagsverket.se/ for Sweden, 
and http://www.prh.fi/ for Finland 
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Next, the sample of portfolio companies was trimmed by removing companies that had 
revenue of less than € 15 million in 2007. The reason is two-fold. Firstly, the sample would be 
nonrepresentative for small companies. Databases generally tend to underreport acquisitions 
of small companies, or these acquisitions can be misclassified. Further, small companies are 
exempt from reporting certain key financial items, or from publishing consolidated accounts. 
Secondly, by excluding small companies I ensure that the sample under study does not 
contain buyouts that could be classified as earlier stage Venture Capital investments with 
focus on growth rather than operational improvements. 
Finally, deal characteristics and exit date was obtained for each portfolio company using web 
searches, data on Zephyr deal records, and web pages of private equity firms. Entry type was 
recorded as divisional buyout, secondary buyout, public-to-private transaction, or other. 
Divisional buyout was defined as vendor being an industrial operating company. In deals 
classified as secondary buyouts the vendor was one of the private equity firms defined. Figure 
5 describes the final buyout sample by initial investment date, country, and entry type. 
Figure 5 – Sample distribution by initial investment date, country, and entry type 
 
Initial investment dates in the sample is relatively evenly distributed between the half-years, 
although slight upward trend is visible as expected. As seen in the figure, the amount of 
secondary buyouts is significantly larger in Sweden compared to the other sample countries, 
attributable to far more developed private equity industry in Sweden. Otherwise, there are no 
apparent differences in the division of buyout types between the countries. The proportions of 
companies in each of the countries are in line with buyout volumes reported by EVCA. 
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Compared to previous studies, the data set has the benefit of including various types of 
buyouts and is thus more representative of the whole buyout universe. Most of the published 
studies on operating performance examine only public-to-private transactions, which is only a 
small fraction of the entirety of deals. Moreover, many of the studies could suffer from 
selection bias. In the U.S., academics are forced to study companies that are subsequently 
listed due to lax disclosure requirements. This could impose a positive bias in the 
performance measures, as companies that go public tend to have positive track record in the 
year preceding the listing. Moreover, when measuring operational performance from entry to 
exit, bankrupt companies are excluded.  
However, it is clear that the data has a lot of potential defects. Databases used to identify the 
deals probably do not cover all of the deals, especially in the smaller end. Moreover, many of 
the companies had to be excluded as the ultimate parent company could not be identified due 
to complicated group structures and missing ownership links in the database.  
5.2 Detection of abnormal performance 
Considerable variation exists in the measures of performance in the existing literature on 
performance of private equity. Barber and Lyon (1996) discuss performance measurement in 
event studies. They break the measurement problem down to three choices; selecting measure 
of operating performance, determining a benchmark, and selecting an appropriate statistical 
test. 
5.2.1 Performance measures 
Barber and Lyon (1996) note that performance measure should be carefully selected 
depending on the research question. For example, IPO firms could overstate their accrual-
based measures, and issuers of new securities could initially underperform in terms o f capital 
efficiency, as it takes times to put the capital in use.  
All of the recent buyout studies use operating income as the main measure of operating 
performance. The reason for this is two-fold. First, operating income is a cleaner measure 
than earnings of the productivity of operating assets, as it excludes special items and taxation. 
Second, leveraged buyouts almost always result in significant increase in leverage and interest 
payments. Thus, the main driver of changes in earnings is the amount of debt instead of 
efficiency of underlying operations. 
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In order to measure operational efficiency of company’s operations, operating income must 
be scaled. Kaplan (1989) scales operating income with book value of assets, while some more 
recent studies scale operating income with various other measures that better reflect the 
capital invested in the company.  
Kaplan (1989) and many other studies analyze operating performance by comparing the 
percentage changes in performance measures. While analyzing changes in performance is 
generally preferred over absolute levels, it comes with two fundamental problems. First, if the 
measure under study is negative in either year over which the percentage change is calculated, 
the result is nonsensical. Thus, researchers are  forced to discard firms that experience losses 
over the sample period, leading to biased results. Second, changes in operating performance 
are implicitly assumed to be proportional to the level of pre-event return ratios. For example, 
consider two firms with equal total assets but different operating income levels. An increase 
of similar absolute size in operating income leads to significantly higher change in return ratio 
for the company with lower initial return.10 
In line with Barber and Lyon (1996) and previous empirical studies by Kaplan (1989a) and 
Guo et al. (2011), I measure percentage changes in all variables, and also test the changes in 
levels for profitability ratios that can have negative values. As the period under study 
comprises recession years, some of the companies are expected to have negative profitability. 
As industry medians tend to be less volatile than company values, percentage changes could 
show a positive bias due to dropping of high number of negative observations in sample firm 
profitability. 
In this thesis, I use EBITDA as the main measure of operating performance, and scale it with 
total assets of the company. The reason to use EBITDA is two-fold. First, cash flow is the 
main measure of value and firmly linked to private equity returns, and EBITDA is the closest 
available proxy of cash flow available in published accounts of the private companies in 
Nordics. Thus, using it maximizes the amount of observations. Secondly, using EBITDA also 
allows for comparison between previous studies.  
5.2.2 Benchmark group 
Purpose of this thesis is to assess whether performance of portfolio companies is unusually 
good after the leveraged buyout event. Thus, it is crucial to determine an appropriate 
                                                 
10
 Firm A: TA $100,000 and $1,000 OI vs. Firm B: $100,000 and $10,000. Increase of $5,000 in  OI leads to 
increases in ROA of +500% and 50%. 
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benchmark to specify expected performance of portfolio companies in absence of the buyout. 
Previous literature uses a variety of alternative benchmarks. Kaplan (1989) uses industry 
adjustment based on SIC-codes, excluding companies with limited capital value. Guo et al. 
(2011) use industry, pre-buyout performance level, the change in pre-buyout performance, 
and the market-to-book assets ratio as the basis for the matching.  
Barber and Lyon (1996) compare nine different models of expected operating performance, 
and come into two important conclusions. First, matching past performance yields test 
statistics that are generally well specified and powerful. This is potentially attributable to the 
average tendency for mean reversion of accounting-based performance measures. Secondly, it 
is important to size-match small firms. The authors also note that researches should hold the 
benchmark group constant over time.  
In this study, I match the peer group by industry, size, and geography. In line with previous 
studies and guidelines in Barber and Lyon (1996), I have used beginning of the observation 
period as the matching point, and use a constant peer group throughout the period.  
For industry classification, I use NACE classification, as it is the original classification code 
given to the sample companies. NACE classification is subject of legislation at the European 
Union level, which imposes the use of the classification uniformly within all member states.  
As I target holding companies or consolidated parent companies, industry code of the parent 
entity could not reflect the actual operations of the company. In this case, I use the industry 
classification of the pre-buyout target company, or largest subsidiary. 
Second, I start by considering only companies domiciled in the Nordic countries for each of 
the peer groups. While many of the companies operate internationally, bulk of the sample 
companies generate majority of their revenues in their home country or other Nordic 
countries. On the other hand, restricting peer groups to companies domiciled in the same 
country would be non-satisfactory because of limited number of satisfactory peer companies 
operating in the same industry. If limited number of peers is available in the Nordic countries, 
the search is widened to cover the whole Europe. 
Finally, the remaining peer companies with matching industry code and nationality is 
matched to the buyout company based on asset size as of 2007. This year is used as the 
reference year, as it best reflects the asset size of the actual portfolio companies, especially in 
cases where portfolio company is a result of merger of two or more smaller companies. Asset 
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matching is common in recent literature, and also yields good results according to Barber and 
Lyon (1996). 
Although Barber and Lyon (1996) argue that implementing past-performance matched peer 
group would yield better results especially for smaller companies and companies that have 
performed especially well or poorly in the past. I have omitted this, as data availability for the 
buyout companies would limit the sample size dramatically. Using a similar 90%-110% past 
performance range would require relaxing of industry or geography restrictions in order to 
acquire a peer group of decent size. 
Peer groups matching was started by first acquiring a list of about 12,000 companies from the 
Orbis database using broad industry searches. Next, companies in the buyout sample and their 
subsidiaries were removed from the list by searching for keywords and registry numbers. In 
addition, companies with limited and/or inconsistent data were removed. Finally, sample 
companies were matched to their corresponding peer groups in a three step process. Minimum 
size of peer group was set to five with closest total asset size. Appendix B describes the 
matching process in detail, and lists the matching criteria for each of the sample companies.  
Industry classification was regarded as the most important matching factor, and thus the most 
accurate 4-digit NACE code was priority in the matching because of the period under study. 
The case of Nimbus boats highlights the importance of good industry matching: The 
cyclicality of building pleasure and sporting boats greatly differs from its 2-digit industry 
group in general, manufacture of other transport equipment, which includes e.g. railway 
locomotives and aircraft.  Moreover, private equity owned companies in general tend to be 
fairly non-diversified, potentially resulting in higher cyclicality compared to peers matched by 
wide industry classifications. 
The matching process also has some potential problems. First, I accepted both unconsolidated 
and consolidated accounts of the peer group companies. Thus, some of the peer group 
companies can be e.g. country organizations of a large international group. However, it is not 
clear if this creates any bias to the result. If some of the overhead costs are borne by parent 
companies, the profitability could be upward biased for the subsidiaries. Thus, when 
measuring percentage changes, the increases and decreases could be deflated. 
Secondly, there are two potential sources survivorship bias in the matching process. As in the 
buyout sample, companies that went bankrupt in the recession are not included in the peer 
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group. Thus, the measure could be slightly upward biased.  In addition, the mean reversion 
problem of accrual-based accounting measures suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996) could 
exist. The authors argue that past-performance matching is important especially in case of 
smaller companies.   
5.2.3 Statistical tests 
Statistical tests for difference are made for unadjusted firm changes and benchmark-adjusted 
changes. I use two alternative change measures depending on the performance measure under 
study. For profitability ratios that can have negative values, percentage point changes are 
calculated to avoid potential biases from discarding observations with negative values. 
Unadjusted change is calculated simply by subtracting the performance in reference period: 
                   
where      is the performance measure of firm i in period t. Benchmark-adjusted abnormal 
performance       is defined as realized performance less expected performance        : 
             (    )                                               
where expected performance is based on the change in median of the peer group    . When 
testing changes for level measures and scaled measures that do not have negative values (e.g. 
sales, sales/employee), logarithmic growth is tested: 
  (
    
      
) 
For adjusted change, the difference in logarithmic growth rate is calculated and tested for 
difference from zero: 
  (
    
      
)   (
     
       
) 
To test the hypotheses, I use Wilcoxon signed-rank test11. Barber and Lyon (1996) find that 
nonparametric test statistics are uniformly more powerful than parametric t-statistics when 
measuring changes in operating measures. The result is attributable to the existence of 
extreme observations in the distribution of the operating performance measure, an issue 
                                                 
11
 Also used by e.g. Kaplan (1989a), Cao and Lerner (2009), and Guo et al. (2011) 
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inherent in buyouts, especially those that could be classified as recapitalizations or 
turnarounds.  To test the null hypothesis in which median abnormal performance is equal to 
zero, I employ the nonparametric Wilcoxon T-statistic. The behavior of T can be predicted 
under the null hypothesis assuming that the original values are coming from the same 
continuous population symmetric about a common median.    
5.3 Explanatory model for operating performance 
In order to test the hypotheses on determinants of abnormal performance, I estimate a 
regression model to test the hypotheses on wealth transfer from employees to owners, effect 
of leverage, and secondary buyouts.  
   
                                            
                                           ,  
Where    is benchmark-adjusted change in operating performance measured in 
EBITDA/sales or EBITDA/total assets in the period 2007-2009,                     is 
EBITDA/sales or EBITDA/total assets in year 2007 depending on the dependent variable, 
                 and                      are percentage point changes in personnel 
costs and net working capital, both proportional to sales.          is the 2007 Net 
debt/EBITDA of the buyout firm.     is a dummy variable for acquisition from other private 
equity firm.  
To avoid potential problems from extreme values, a ll continuous variables are Winsorized at 
1% and 99% levels. All regressions are Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions with 
heteroskedasticity-consistent Huber-White standard errors. 
5.4 Accounting data 
As discussed above, the primary source of accounting data has been Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis 
database. In some cases data provided by the private equity firm or the company’s annual 
report have been used. Although incomplete, data for majority of the companies was available 
from these sources. Ideally, the accounting data could have been more complete if 
complemented with data from the national registries. 
All data is based on Orbis’ Global standard format, which is a standardized template used to 
increase comparability between alternative accounting principles. All fiscal years that diverge 
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from the ordinary 12 months ending in December are annualized and/or transformed. Asset 
scaled measures are calculated using average assets during the fiscal year when data is 
available. 
6 Results and analysis 
This chapter presents the results for the operating performance changes. I begin by presenting 
the summary statistics and results for full sample. Next, I divide the sample first to 
subsamples based on country of domicile and type of the initial buyout. Finally, I present the 
results for the regression model.  
6.1 Summary statistics 
Table 5 describes the sample of portfolio companies. In total, the sample contains 144 
companies for which financial data was available. 40% are companies domiciled in Sweden. 
Buyouts classified as other (a company that was not public, in private equity ownership, or 
owned by an industrial group at the time of the buyout) account for 50 % of the full sample.   
Amount of secondary buyouts in Sweden is notable, and potentially attributable to the 
developed private equity industry. 
Table 5 – Distribution of sample by buyout type and geography 
The table presents number of sample companies (number as a percentage of full sample) by country of 
domicile and initial buyout type. 
 
Sweden Norway Denmark Finland Total 
Other buyouts 23 (16%) 23 (16%) 16 (11%) 10 (7%) 72 (50%) 
Secondary buyout 17 (12%) 4 (3%) 5 (3%) 6 (4%) 32 (22%) 
Divisional buyout 16 (11%) 6 (4%) 3 (2%) 6 (4%) 31 (22%) 
Public-to-private 2 (1%) 5 (3%) 2 (1%) 0 (0%) 9 (6%) 
Total 58 (40%) 38 (26%) 26 (18%) 22 (15%) 144 (100%) 
 
Table 6 presents sample companies by industries. Largest industry section in the sample is by 
far manufacturing, which accounts for 48 % of the sample companies. Wholesale and retail 
trade accounts for 24 % of the sample, with the rest of the industries splitting the remaining 
28 %.  
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 Table 6 – Distribution of sample by industry 
The table presents sample companies grouped by NACE Rev. 2 main industry sections. Industries with 
zero companies are not shown. 
NACE Section # of obs. % of total 
Manufacturing 69 48 % 
Wholesale and retail trade 35 24 % 
Transportation and storage  7 5 % 
Administrative and support service activities 7 5 % 
Construction 6 4 % 
Information and communication 6 4 % 
Professional, scientific, and technical activities 4 3 % 
Human health and social work activities 4 3 % 
Arts, enterntainment and recreation 3 2 % 
Accomodation and food service activities 2 1 % 
Other service activities 1 1 % 
 
Table 7 presents the summary statistics for characteristics of the sample companies. Majority 
of the companies have sales between about €20 million and €1 billion, with a typical sample 
company with sales of about €100 million. Median EBITDA-margin of 10.16 is similar to 
previous studies by Kaplan (1989) and Guo et al. (2011).  Leverage measured as Net 
Debt/EBITDA shows a median value of 5.20x, which is slightly lower to values reported by 
Guo et al. (2011) for years 2005-2006.  
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Table 7 – Summary statistics for mean and median firm characteristics (full sample) 
The table reports sample characteristics as of 2007. Sales, total assets, sales/employee, and average 
cost of employee are reported in thousand Euros, profitability ratios in percentage points, and Net 
Debt/EBITDA as a multiple of EBITDA. 
 # of obs. 5 % 95 % Median Mean 
Sales (EUR th) 135 21,603 1,165,228 108,578 343,578 
Total assets (EUR th) 133 14,637 1,567,495 125,367 421,443 
Net Debt/EBITDA  124 -0.37x 32.11x 5.20x 18.82x 
Book equity/total assets 133 -2 % 48 % 16 % 18 % 
EBITDA/sales  133 0.12 24.86 10.16 10.89 
EBITDA/total assets 132 0.10 21.13 9.02 9.16 
Net working capital/sales 129 1.41 41.10 16.93 19.00 
Stocks/sales 116 0.57 31.61 11.31 12.18 
Receivables/sales 128 1.17 29.68 14.10 14.87 
Payables/sales 129 1.43 20.41 7.68 8.65 
Sales/employee (EUR th) 110 93 1,088 306 473 
Personnel costs/sales 111 6.48 58.97 22.55 26.24 
Average cost of employee (EUR th) 87 34.18 103.06 66.93 66.15 
 
6.2 Changes in operating performance 
Large positive gains in return to invested capital reported in previous studies (See e.g. Guo et 
al., 2011) suggest that one of the main drivers of value creation is true economic value 
creation at the operational level. In order to analyze the impact of private equity ownership on 
operating performance, changes in the period 2007-2009 for various performance measures 
were calculated. In addition, all companies under study are benchmarked against their 
respective peer groups matched on industry and size. The methodology applied allows 
comparison to Kaplan (1989) and Guo et al. (2011), although differences in matching 
methodology and sample characteristics exist. I begin by analyzing the full sample, and then 
divide the sample to sub-samples based on country and type of buyout.  Then, I relate the 
observed abnormal operating performance gains to variables that could explain the increased 
performance.  
Table 8 reports unadjusted changes in operating performance variables. The first column 
reports changes from 2007 to 2008, second column from 2008 to 2009, and the last column 
change for the whole period from 2007 to 2009. 
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Table 8 – Unadjusted changes in operating performance 2007-2009 (full sample) 
The table reports changes in unadjusted operating performance. Changes in EBITDA/sales and 
EBITDA/total assets are reported in percentage points; all other changes are percentage changes. 
NWC denotes net working capital. Values in parentheses show number of observations and positive 
observations.  Significance levels are based on two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test. *, **, and *** 
denote levels that are significantly different from zero at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 2007-2008 2008-2009 2007-2009 
A. Growth       
Sales growth 0.89 % (132;70)* -1.34 % (130;63) 2.25 % (127;70)* 
B. Profitability       
EBITDA/sales -0.120 (130;63) -0.464 (127;60) -0.435 (126;54) 
EBITDA/total assets  1.315 (129;78) -0.291 (125;56) 0.719 (123;69) 
D. Employment       
Sales/employee -10.86 % (106;30)*** 3.10 % (105;63)* -2.85 % (102;45) 
Personnel costs/sales  1.75 % (107;71)*** 2.73 % (105;70)*** 6.02 % (102;73)*** 
Avg cost of employee -4.81 % (82;32) 6.41 % (79;60)*** 1.71 % (78;42)** 
E. Working capital       
NWC*/sales -8.58 % (118;46)*** -3.54 % (123;52)* -12.01 % (114;34)*** 
Stocks/sales -4.58 % (112;48)** -4.93 % (113;42)** -9.92 % (108;33)*** 
Receivables/sales  -8.58 % (124;42)*** -2.50 % (123;54) -11.70 % (118;40)*** 
Payables/sales  -4.85 % (126;53)* -7.15 % (125;52) -10.90 % (121;45)*** 
*Net working capital 
 
Unadjusted operating performance measures reported above show insignificant statistical 
difference from zero for sales growth and EBITDA/sales and EBITDA/total assets. Median 
sales growth is 2.25%, and median EBITDA-margin decreases by about 0.4 percentage 
points. EBITDA in relation to total assets shows an increase, which can be explained by 
increased capital efficiency in the sample firms.  
Employment measures show insignificant decrease in Sales/employee for the whole period 
2007-2009. Average cost of employee has increased significantly, as has personnel costs/ 
sales. Working capital measures decrease across the board, as expected in downturn. Median 
net working capital in relation to sales decreases about 12%, which partially could affect 
positive development in EBITDA/total assets. 
However, as the economic downturn in the study period affects growth in profitability, sales 
and working capital, it is particularly important to compare the changes in sample firms to 
their matched peer group in order to identify abnormal performance. 
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Table 9 adjusts performance gains in sample firms by subtracting the median of peer group 
matched on industry and size. Compared to their respective peer groups, private equity 
backed firms seem to have significant performance gains. Sales growth is significantly higher 
in both years and the full period, and also the economic size of the growth difference is 
significant 15.05% for full period, and 3.5% to 4.6% in 2007-2009 and 2008-2009, 
respectively. However, it is important to remember that as the data has not been adjusted for 
acquisitions, the sales figures can reflect inorganic growth in private equity owned firms. 
Table 9 – Adjusted changes in operating performance (full sample) 
The table reports changes in adjusted operating performance. EBITDA/sales and EBITDA/total assets 
is reported in percentage points and subtracts median of peer group; all other measures are sample firm 
percentage changes subtracted by peer group change in median. Values in parentheses show number 
of observations and positive observations.  Significance levels are based on two-tailed Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test. *, **, and *** denote levels that are significantly different from zero at 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively.  
 
2007-2008 2008-2009 2007-2009 
A. Growth       
Sales growth 4.57 % (132;72)*** 3.45 % (130;75)** 15.05 % (127;86)*** 
B. Profitability       
EBITDA/sales 0.968 (130;80)*** 0.400 (127;68) 1.640 (126;75)*** 
EBITDA/total assets 2.322 (129;82)*** 1.079 (125;73) 2.260 (123;78)*** 
D. Employment       
Sales/employee  -3.09 % (106;47) 7.26 % (105;69)*** 4.94 % (102;63)*** 
Personnel costs/sales  1.19 % (106;57) -1.85 % (104;44) 0.70 % (101;51) 
Avg cost of employee  -4.38 % (81;34) 3.73 % (78;49)* 1.01 % (77;39) 
E. Working capital       
NWC*/sales -10.56 % (116;46)** 1.44 % (122;64) -13.10 % (112;46)** 
Stocks/sales -6.91 % (112;47)** -0.61 % (113;54) -7.05 % (108;43)** 
Receivables/sales -4.50 % (124;55) -5.66 % (123;50) -8.60 % (118;54)* 
Payables/sales 1.88 % (126;65) 0.93 % (125;64) -3.38 % (121;58) 
*Net working capital 
 
EBITDA/sales and EBITDA/total assets show significant increases, which is mainly 
attributable to performance gains in 2007-2008. This is in line with the theories of private 
equity backed firms reacting swiftly to changes in economic conditions. Moreover, the 
magnitude of the change is significant comparing to the initial median values of about 10% 
for EBITDA/sales and 9% for EBITDA/total assets (see Table 7), equaling about 20% 
increase.  
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Thirdly, employment measures show significant increase in employee productivity measured 
in sales/employee, which can be explained by better sales development of private equity 
backed firms in relation to their peer groups. Other changes in employment measures relative 
to peers are insignificant and small. Thus, the data does not support the notion that wages 
have decreased or personnel have been cut any more than in benchmark group. 
Finally, working capitals measures provide evidence that private equity backed firms were 
able to better manage their working capital during the period under study. Net working capital 
shows significant decrease of 13% in 2007-2009 in relation to the benchmark. The change is 
mostly attributable to decrease in stocks and receivables, which both show significant 
decrease.  The result is in line with Smith (1990), who found similar change in net working 
capital also attributable to changes in inventories and receivables. 
To sum up, the sample firms show, as expected, significant improvements in operating 
performance measures compared to the benchmark. However, unadjusted changes show little 
or no improvement in performance measures. This can potentially lead to many unsuccessful 
buyout deals and firms in the coming years, if the prices paid in the boom years reflected 
significant expected increases in cash flows. Moreover, many highly levered firms have been 
forced to bankruptcy or renegotiate their loans (almost always entailing additional equity 
investment) due to their inability to pay the high interest payments. Thus, the average returns 
of the private equity asset class are expected to be lower in the years to come, as historically 
have been after a buyout boom (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). 
6.2.1 Variation in operating performance across countries 
One of the most important questions in the limited buyout research is how performance varies 
across transaction types, and countries. The purpose of the analysis on the country and buyout 
type sub-samples is to gain knowledge of the potential differences between the operating 
performance gains and characteristics of private equity backed firms in the Nordic countries, 
although the scope of this study does not cover investigation of the underlying determinants. 
In this sub-section, I divided the sample into subsamples based on the country of domicile. 
The next sub-section analyzes the differences between buyout types. 
Table 10 reports country-specific characteristics of the sample firms. Median size in terms of 
operating revenue and assets is in Denmark, while Sweden and Finland have relatively the 
highest amount of smaller deals. Differences in profitability and return to assets are relatively 
small. 
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Table 10 – Summary statistics for mean and median firm characteristics (grouped by 
country) 
The table presents median sample characteristics by country of domicile as of 2007. Sales, Total 
Assets, Sales/Employee, and Average cost per employee are reported in thousand Euros, all other 
ratios in percentage points.  
Variable Sweden Denmark Norway Finland 
Average Sales (EUR th) 85,878 142,519 105,359 85,232 
Average Total assets (EUR th) 94,131 148,228 126,410 96,564 
Median EBITDA/sales 9.72 11.02 10.42 9.83 
Median EBITDA/total assets 8.47 10.03 8.37 9.58 
Net working capital/sales 15.65 17.13 21.49 17.36 
Stocks/sales 11.40 9.47 12.45 15.34 
Receivables/sales 14.94 14.08 13.78 13.11 
Payables/sales 7.90 8.66 7.08 6.76 
Sales/employee (EUR th) 315 295 291 276 
Personnel costs/sales 21.84 21.13 24.03 24.09 
Average cost of employee (EUR th) 71.13 67.18 81.88 51.37 
 
Table 11 reports the industry distribution in country sub-samples. The relative amount of 
manufacturing companies is clearly highest in the Finnish sub-sample, while other sub-
samples have relatively higher amount of companies operating in the wholesale and retail 
trade industries.  
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Table 11 – Distribution of country sub-samples by industry 
This table presents the number of sample companies grouped by NACE Rev. 2 main industry sections 
and country of domicile. Values in parenthesis show the number of observations in relation to total 
sub-sample companies. Industries with zero companies are left out from the table. 
NACE Section Sweden Denmark Norway Finland 
Manufacturing 28 (48%) 20 (53%) 7 (27%) 14 (64%) 
Wholesale and retail trade 14 (24%) 10 (26%) 9 (35%) 2 (9%) 
Transportation and storage 3 (5%) 2 (5%) 1 (4%) 1 (5%) 
Administrative and support service activities 1 (2%) 2 (5%) 1 (4%) 3 (14%) 
Construction 3 (5%) 1 (3%) 2 (8%) 0 (0%) 
Information and communication 2 (3%) 2 (5%) 2 (8%) 0 (0%) 
Professional, scientific, and technical activities 1 (2%) 0 (0%) 1 (4%) 2 (9%) 
Human health and social work activities 4 (7%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Arts, enterntainment and recreation 0 (0%) 1 (3%) 2 (8%) 0 (0%) 
Accomodation and food service activities  2 (3%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Other service activities 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 
Total 58 (100%) 38 (100%) 26 (100%) 22 (100%) 
 
Table 12 reports benchmark-adjusted changes in operating performance for the country sub-
samples. Significant differences between countries exist, although low number of 
observations limits ability to draw strict conclusions. Especially data on number of employees 
limits observations on employment figures in Norwegian sub-sample, where average cost of 
employee could not been calculated for any of companies. 
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Table 12 – Adjusted changes in operating performance (grouped by country) 
The table reports absolute changes in adjusted operating performance. EBITDA/sales and 
EBITDA/total assets is reported in percentage points and subtracts median of peer group; all other 
measures are percentage changes subtracted by peer group change in median. Values in parentheses 
show number of observations and positive observations.  Significance levels are based on two-tailed 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. *, **, and *** denote levels that are significantly different from zero at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Sweden Denmark Norway Finland 
A. Growth         
Sales growth  17.66 %  (51;36)*** 11.37 %  (34;22)*** 18.66 %  (24;17)*** 8.65 % (18;11) 
B. Profitability         
EBITDA/sales 2.240 (52;33)** -0.380 (34;15) 2.758 (24;19)* 0.115 (16;8) 
EBITDA/total assets  2.499 (50;34)*** -0.193 (35;16) 3.089 (23;18)* 0.605 (15;10) 
D. Employment         
Sales/employee 5.23 %  (48;31)** 3.46 % (32;18) 16.82 % (4;3) 9.83 %  (18;11)* 
Personnel costs/sales 3.47 % (32;18) 0.35 % (34;17) -1.52 % (20;9) 0.00 % (15;7) 
Avg cost of employee 2.18 % (29;16) 1.01 % (33;17) n.a. (0;0) -1.95 % (15;6) 
E. Working capital         
NWC*/sales -17.26 % (44;15)** -3.74 % (31;13) -0.47 % (19;9) -2.94 % (18;9) 
Stocks/sales -16.65 % (43;15)*** -1.81 % (32;15) -5.69 % (19;6) 5.34 % (14;7) 
Receivables/sales -3.81 % (48;23) -20.28 %  (32;12)** 9.87 % (21;12) -16.68 % (17;7) 
Payables/sales -7.48 % (49;23) -6.54 % (34;14) 11.11 % (21;12) 4.20 % (17;9) 
*Net working capital 
 
Sales growth compared to the benchmark group is large and significant for Sweden, 
Denmark, and Norway. In Finnish sub-sample, the increase in sales is slightly smaller and 
insignificant. It seems that the buyout companies grew more than their benchmark groups in 
all of the countries, which potentially reflects the general tendency of buyout firms to make 
more acquisitions compared to other companies.  
Interestingly, clear differences emerge in profitability ratios. Swedish and Norwegian 
companies have increased both sales and asset scaled EBITDA far more than their Danish and 
Finnish counterparties; a result which exists both in unadjusted and adjusted values12.  In 
employment measures, some differences emerge in employee productivity. It appears that 
employee productivity in Finnish buyouts tend to increase more than in Danish and Swedish 
companies. However, due to limited data, no clear conclusions of country differences can be 
made.  
                                                 
12
 See Table 18 in Appendix C for unadjusted changes . 
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In terms of working capital changes, Swedish companies have performed well compared to 
the other countries. The increased working capital efficiency appears to be attributable to 
deceases in inventories.  Denmark shows significant decrease in receivables; however, the 
overall change in net working capital remains low and insignificant. 
To conclude, the results suggest that Swedish and Norwegian buyouts have performed far 
better than their Danish and Finnish counterparts, both in terms of sales growth and 
profitability measures. However, the underlying reasons for the varying performance remain 
unclear. Descriptive statistics and examination of the distributions of the initial differences do 
not provide clear conclusions. Potentially, the differences could be explained by obvious 
differences in the characteristics of acquired companies (e.g. industry, company size), or 
regional differences in the expertise of the buyout firms, which has been shown to have 
significant impact on overall performance of buyouts.   
6.2.2 Variation in operating performance across type of buyout 
Another important open question that Strömberg (2008) points out is the need to understand 
how performance varies across transaction types.  Previous research has mainly focused on 
large public-to-private transactions, which potentially have highly divergent characteristics 
and motivation from the other sub-types of buyouts. In order to make any conclusions on the 
economic impact of leveraged buyouts and private equity, it is important to assess the full 
variety of buyout types and how vary in their ability to create economic value.  
Table 13 presents summary characteristics grouped by type of buyout. Public-to-private 
transactions target larger companies than other types of buyouts. Similarly, secondary buyouts 
are larger than primary buyouts in private-to-private transactions, which is expected if 
companies tend to grow under private equity ownership. In terms of initial profitability, 
public-to-private transactions outperform other transactions, but due to small number of 
observations generalization is difficult.  
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Table 13 – Summary statistics for mean and median firm characteristics (grouped by 
type of buyout) 
The table presents median sample characteristics by country as of 2007. Sales, Total Assets, 
Sales/Employee, and Average cost of employee are reported in thousand Euros, all other ratios in 
percentage points.  
 
Public-to-
private 
Divisional 
buyouts 
Secondary 
buyouts 
Other 
Sales (EUR th) 411,172 84,293 168,803 88,339 
Total assets (EUR th) 1,495,829 96,564 283,441 81,500 
EBITDA/Sales 16.08 13.06 8.87 9.61 
EBITDA/Total assets 11.65 8.03 9.65 9.17 
Net working capital/Sales 13.98 16.20 19.69 17.11 
Stocks/Sales 4.63 11.94 11.68 11.11 
Receivables/Sales 15.91 14.08 14.97 13.49 
Payables/Sales 8.90 8.01 8.15 7.22 
Sales/Employee (EUR th) 260 273 276 328 
Personnel costs/Sales 26.61 26.38 25.92 21.13 
Average cost of employee (EUR th) 67.29 72.11 59.77 67.18 
 
Table 14 presents the distribution of different types of buyouts across industries. Divisional 
buyouts and secondary buyouts seem to target more manufacturing companies, while buyouts 
classified as Other have relatively higher fraction of companies in wholesale and retail trade 
industries.  
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Table 14 – Distribution of buyout type sub-sample by industry 
This table presents the number of sample companies grouped by NACE Rev. 2 main industry sections 
and type of initial buyout. Values in parenthesis show the number of observations in relation to total 
sub-sample companies. Industries with zero companies are left out from the table. 
NACE Section Public-to-
privates 
Divisional 
buyouts 
Secondary 
buyouts 
Other 
Manufacturing 4 (44%) 19 (61%) 16 (50%) 30 (42%) 
Wholesale and retail trade 1 (11%) 2 (6%) 4 (13%) 28 (39%) 
Transportation and storage 0 (0%) 2 (6%) 1 (3%) 4 (6%) 
Administrative and support service activities 2 (22%) 3 (10%) 1 (3%) 1 (1%) 
Construction 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (6%) 4 (6%) 
Information and communication 1 (11%) 1 (3%) 3 (9%) 1 (1%) 
Professional, scientific, and technical activities 0 (0%) 2 (6%) 2 (6%) 0 (0%) 
Human health and social work activities 1 (11%) 0 (0%) 2 (6%) 1 (1%) 
Arts, enterntainment and recreation 0 (0%) 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 2 (3%) 
Accomodation and food service activities  0 (0%) 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 
Other service activities 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 
Total 9 (100%) 31 (100%) 32 (100%) 72 (100%) 
 
Table 16 reports adjusted changes in operating performance, grouped by type of the buyout. 
As majority of deals are classified as Other, number of observations in other types are limited. 
However, some significant differences emerge, and variation across buyout types is large.  
Sales growth is large and statistically significant in Secondary buyouts and buyouts classified 
as Other. This could mean that value creation in these buyout classes in more focused on 
consolidation and restructuring of industries. This makes sense, if in SBO cases 
improvements conducted by the previous private equity owner limit the ability to create value 
through operational engineering. Moreover, previous owners of companies that are classified 
as Other consist of family offices and financial owners, whose potentially limited financial 
resources could attract private equity firms to invest in particularly good growth prospects.  
EBITDA/sales and EBITDA/total assets show positive values for all other buyout types 
except public-to-privates. Divisional buyouts have by far highest gains, while secondary 
buyouts and other show significant gains for only asset scaled measure.  The exceptional 
performance of divisional buyouts is interesting. One interpretation of the result is that the 
potential for operating gains is the highest for companies that were previously considered 
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non-core divisions by their parent groups. Unadjusted results confirm the outperformance of 
divisional buyouts.13 
Table 15 –Adjusted changes in operating performance 2007-2009 (grouped by type of 
buyout) 
The table reports unadjusted and adjusted changes in operating performance grouped by buyout type. 
EBITDA/sales and EBITDA/total assets is reported in percentage points and subtracts median of peer 
group; all other measures are percentage changes subtracted by peer group change in median. Values 
in parentheses show number of observations and positive observations.  Significance levels are based 
on two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test. *, **, and *** denote levels that are significantly different 
from zero at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Public-to-
privates 
Divisional 
 buyouts 
Secondary 
 buyouts 
Other 
A. Growth         
Sales growth 5.70 % (8;4) 7.73 % (27;16) 18.60 %  (26;18)*** 16.55 %  (66;48)*** 
B. Profitability         
EBITDA/sales -1.69 (8;3) 6.15 (27;19)** 1.39 (26;16) 1.43 (65;37) 
EBITDA/total assets  -0.92 (8;3) 3.33 (26;17)* 1.74 (23;15)** 2.83 (66;43)*** 
D. Employment         
Sales/employee 2.88 % (7;5) 7.46 % (24;14) 4.80 %  (23;14)* 4.91 %  (48;30)** 
Personnel costs/sales 1.74 % (6;3) -2.81 % (19;7) 2.32 % (16;9) 1.44 % (60;32) 
Avg cost of employee -1.53 % (5;2) 0.43 % (16;8) -7.21 % (13;6) 1.98 % (43;23) 
E. Working capital         
NWC*/sales  -16.82 % (5;2) 0.80 % (22;11) -15.02 % (24;10) -18.82 %  (61;23)** 
Stocks/sales -5.64 % (6;3) 0.23 % (21;11) -8.20 % (23;10) -11.68 %  (58;19)** 
Receivables/sales -3.30 % (7;3) -16.68 % (25;10)* -2.71 % (24;12) -7.13 % (62;29) 
Payables/sales 17.53 % (7;5) -18.01 % (25;8) -6.03 % (25;10) 4.41 % (64;35) 
*Net working capital 
 
Adjusted Sales per employee is significant and above zero for secondary buyouts and Other. 
Adjusted Personnel costs/sales is negative in Divisional buyouts. Net working capital 
measures show large decreases for all types except divisional buyouts, although only 
difference for Other is significant.  
Although analysis on transaction types shows significant differences between buyout groups, 
it is important to note that country differences could affect the results. As seen in Table 5, 
majority of sample companies that are classified to DBO and SBO categories are Swedish 
companies. Thus, the type-specific results could partially reflect country differences, if they 
                                                 
13
 See Table 19 in Appendix C for unadjusted changes. 
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exist. Examination of the isolated country and type differences is practically impossible due to 
limitations in the sample size. 
6.3 Determinants of operating performance 
Although median changes in operating performance are small on average, the variation in 
performance measures is relatively large. To examine the determinants of operating 
performance I employ multivariate regressions to test the hypotheses 6-8.  
Table 16 – Regressions for operating performance 
Table 9 reports the multivariate regression results for change in operating performance measures 
2007-2009. In models (1) and (2) dependent variable is unadjusted percentage point change in 
operating measure; in (3) and (4) adjusted measure is examined. Initial adjusted operating measure is 
EBITDA/Sales for models (1) and (2) and EBITDA/Total assets for models (3) and (4). Independent 
variables for operating measures are unadjusted. P-values in parentheses. All regressions are OLS with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All continuous variables are winsorized at 2% and 98% 
levels. ***, **, and * indicate significante at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  
  
(1) 
Change in 
unadjusted 
EBITDA/sales 
(2) 
Change in 
unadjusted 
EBITDA/assets 
(3) 
Change in 
adjusted 
EBITDA/sales 
(4) 
Change in 
adjusted 
EBITDA/ assets 
Initial EBITDA/Sales or 
EBITDA/total assets 
0.073 -0.132 -0.016 -0.339** 
(0.296) (0.229) (0.851) (0.021) 
Change in Personnel 
cost/sales 
-0.808*** -0.832*** -0.415** -0.259 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.233) 
Change in net working 
capital/sales 
0.073 -0.132 -0.016 -0.339 
(0.755) (0.355) (0.201) (0.884) 
Net Debt/EBITDA 0.196** 0.254** 0.179** 0.126 
(0.022) (0.013) (0.043) (0.274) 
SBO dummy 1.286 2.615* 0.237 -0.224 
(0.280) (0.061) (0.873)   (0.894) 
Constant -1.851** -2.623** 0.623 0.795 
(0.041) (0.023) (0.546) (0.539) 
Number of obs. 94 94 94 94 
R
2
 0.269 0.294 0.135 0.142 
 
Results of the cross-sectional regressions are reported in Table 16. Columns (1) and (2) report 
models with unadjusted changes, and columns (3) and (4) are models with benchmark-
adjusted EBITDA/sales and EBITDA/total assets changes as dependent variables. All 
regressions control for initial adjusted value of dependent variable, as the ability to improve 
operating performance may be greatest for firms who underperform their peers in the 
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beginning of the period. Thus, initial value controls for target selection that is not directly 
related to private equity firms’ ability to create economic value.  Other independent variables 
include Change in Personnel costs/sales, Change in Net Working Capital/sales, Net 
Debt/EBITDA as of 2007. SBO is a dummy variable indicating that the transaction was a 
secondary buyout.  
The regressions show that companies with higher decrease in personnel costs per sales 
perform better, although the coefficient for adjusted EBITDA/total assets is insignificant. For 
unadjusted changes, the significance is obvious, as the size of the coefficient. For change in 
adjusted EBITDA/sales, one percentage point decrease in personnel cost/sales attributes to 
0.42 percentage point increase in abnormal margin improvement. The interpretation could be 
either that private equity firms are able to increase productivity in their portfolio companies or 
decrease wages. Additional regressions with Personnel cost breakdown to productivity 
(sales/employee) and wages (average cost of employee) do not provide significant results due 
to limited number of observations on the amount of employees in the sample. Thus, I cannot 
conclude if abnormal performance is explained by improved productivity or decrease in 
wages. 
In addition, firms with higher leverage seem to perform better, consistent with the free cash 
flow hypothesis.  SBO shows positive and significant value for change in uadjusted 
EBITDA/total assets. For adjusted change, SBO dummy does not show any significance. 
Therefore, the regressions leave open the question on whether secondary buyouts have any 
impact on the abnormal operating performance. 
7 Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have analyzed how operational performance of Nordic private equity backed 
companies acquired in the latest buyout boom has developed in the subsequent economic 
downturn of 2007-2009. I use a novel dataset combining deal characteristics and accounting 
data of 144 companies with revenues over € 15 million domiciled in Sweden, Finland, 
Norway and Denmark. While existing literature is largely focused on public-to-private deals 
in U.S. markets, I provide evidence I contribute by providing insights on the future 
development of the Nordic private equity industry by shedding light on the operational 
success of the companies acquired in the buyout boom. Additionally, I add to the knowledge 
on variation of performance changes across geographies and deal types. 
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Table 17 – Summary of hypotheses 
Hypothesis Support 
H1: Profitability of buyouts companies is improved relative to their respective peer group Yes 
H2: Personnel costs in relation to sales decrease in buyout companies compared to their 
respective peer group 
No 
H3: Personnel cost per employee decrease in buyout companies compared to their 
respective peer group 
No 
H4: Sales per employee increase in buyout companies compared to their respective peer 
group 
Yes 
H5: Net working capital/sales decreases in the buyout companies compared to their 
respective peer group 
Yes 
H6: Higher leverage are associated with higher abnormal operating performance Yes 
H7: Primary buyouts show higher abnormal operating performance than secondary 
buyouts 
No 
H8: Decrease in Personnel costs/sales leads to higher abnormal operating performance Yes 
H9: Decrease in Net Working Capital/sales leads to higher abnormal operating 
performance 
No 
See Table 20 in Appendix C for Summary of adjusted 2007-2009 changes in key operating measures 
 
In line with previous studies, I found that private equity ownership in the full sample is 
associated with significant positive abnormal performance on company’s EBITDA-margin 
(+1.64 ppt.) and EBITDA/total assets (+2.26 ppt.) compared to an industry- and size-matched 
benchmark. Recent studies on public-to-private buyouts have found little or no improvement 
in these measures (Guo et al., 2011).  
Employment-related measures show no significant difference in personnel costs/sales and 
average cost of employee, thus contradicting the hypothesis that private equity buyouts have 
negative impact on wages and employment. However, productivity as measured in sales per 
employee shows significant increase of about 5% compared to the benchmark group. 
However, the ability to make strict conclusions is limited due to the extraordinary period 
under study. The better sales growth of PE-backed companies and inflexible labour market in 
the Nordics may have contributed to the results. 
Working capital measures also show significant improvement. In line with previous study by 
Smith (1990), benchmark-adjusted net working capital decreases 13%, attributable to 
decreases in inventories and receivables rather than payables.  
Taken together, data supports the notion that private equity model is able to create economic 
value also in downturn. There is evidence on increased profitability without data supporting 
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the hypothesis on wealth transfers from employees to owners. Moreover, the decrease in 
working capital is not attributable to delaying payments to suppliers.  However, unadjusted 
changes in profitability, growth, and return to assets show non-significant differences from 
zero. This potentially suggests poor returns for private equity if the high prices paid in the 
latest buyout boom reflected high growth expectations and margin improvements, and not 
only cheap financing.  
Examination of operating performance in various sub-samples shows a large variation 
between countries and deal types. The positive abnormal performance in the full sample is 
attributable to good performance of Swedish and Norwegian buyouts. Moreover, significant 
variation exists between transaction type sub-samples, which show that divisional buyouts 
have performed clearly better than other buyout types relative to peers and on a stand-alone 
basis.  
Regression analyses on determinants of abnormal performance support the hypothesis on 
positive effect of leverage on operating performance, in line with Guo et al. (2011). Moreover, 
I find some support for the hypothesis on wealth transfer from employees to owners (Shleifer 
and Summers, 1988), as decrease in personnel costs relative to sales has significant positive 
impact on abnormal EBITDA margin change. I did not find support for the hypothesis that 
secondary buyouts do not generate operational improvements. 
The variation in performance change across deal-types potentially suggests that motivation 
for different types of buyouts can vary. Divisional buyouts can potentially have the best 
potential for pure operational engineering, while other buyouts squeeze value through other 
levers of value creation. This is an uncharted territory in the current buyout literature, and a 
potential avenue for future research as it has helps policy makers to understand the relative 
economic importance of different types of buyout investors.  
The variation in performance across countries is also notable, but strict conclusions cannot be 
made due to small sample sizes. Underlying differences in market conditions and 
development stage likely play a role, as differences in characteristics of deals and companies. 
Future research has first to gather knowledge on the variation by deal characteristics before 
meaningful research on country level differences can be done. However, the results imply that 
Swedish and Norwegian buyouts will have better returns in the future, which may imply 
better fund-raising prospects for private equity in these markets. 
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Although private equity ownership has had positive impact on many measures of operating 
performance in the Nordics, the insignificant unadjusted change found in this thesis casts 
doubt on ability of the investments to achieve the high required returns. Combined with the 
tough market conditions, going forward, private equity industry in the Nordics will have 
trouble exiting their investments at high returns, potentially affecting the fund-raising and 
growth of the industry in the next five years.  
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Appendix A – Sample firms  
Sample firm PE firm Country Entry Exit Entry 
type 
Exit 
type 
Aalborg Industries Altor Equity Partners DK 09/2005  SBO  
Addpro Polaris SE 05/2005  Other  
Ahlsell Goldman Sachs Capital Partners, 
Cinven 
SE 01/2006  SBO  
A-Katsastus Bridgepoint Capital FI 11/2005  SBO  
Aleris EQT SE 02/2005 07/2010 Other SBO 
Alignment Systems FSN Capital SE 03/2006  SBO  
Alimak Hek Triton SE 01/2007  SBO  
Ambea 3i Group SE 12/2005 03/2010 SBO SBO 
Annas Pepparkakor Accent Equity Partners SE 08/2005 11/2008 DBO STR* 
Anticimex Ratos SE 12/2005  SBO  
Arcus-Gruppen Ratos NO 07/2005  Other  
Arovit Petfood Gilde Buyout DK 09/2006 01/2009 Other Bank-
ruptcy 
Asiakastieto GMT Communication Partners FI 07/2006 05/2008 DBO SBO 
Atelje Margaretha Litorina SE 02/2005  Other  
Atos Medical Nordic Capital SE 04/2005  DBO  
Attendo Industri Kapital SE 01/2007  SBO  
Aura Light FSN Capital SE 04/2006  SBO  
Ball Group Axcel DK 12/2006  Other  
Bang & Olufsen Medicom LD Invest Equity DK 03/2007  DBO  
Barona Group Sponsor Capital FI 05/2007  Other  
BecoTek Metal Group Norvestor SE 11/2006  Other  
Beerenberg Corp Herkules Capital NO 05/2006  Other  
BIVA Møbler Dania Capital DK 06/2006 12/2008 Other SBO 
Blueway AS Reiten & Co NO 11/2006  Other  
Bodilsen EQT DK 11/2006 06/2009 Other Bank-
ruptcy 
Bravida Triton NO 11/2006  SBO  
BTX Group EQT DK 06/2005  Other  
Byggmax Altor Equity Partners SE 12/2005 06/2010 Other IPO 
Capio Apax Partners, Nordic Capital SE 11/2006  Other  
Cardinal foods Capman NO 03/2005  Other  
Chr. Hansen PAI Partners DK 07/2005  Other  
Cimbria EQT DK 05/2007  Other  
Color Print Polaris DK 09/2006  Other  
Com Hem Carlyle Group SE 04/2006  SBO  
Contex Group Ratos SE 06/2007  SBO  
Dako EQT DK 05/2007  DBO  
DISA Holding Procuritas DK 05/2005 09/2008 DBO SBO 
EET Nordic Capidea DK 04/2007 12/2010 Other FIN** 
EFG European Furniture 
Group 
Herkules Capital SE 05/2007  Other  
Elematic Sentica Partners FI 08/2006 10/2007 Other SBO 
Elixia Norvestor NO 08/2006  DBO  
Erätukku Sponsor Capital FI 09/2005  Other  
EskoArtwork Axcel DK 10/2005 01/2011 Other STR* 
Espresso House Holding Palamon capital Partners SE 04/2006  Other  
Euro Cater Altor Equity Partners DK 12/2006  Other  
EuroMaint Ratos SE 06/2007  DBO  
European House of Beds Herkules Capital NO 02/2006  Other  
Falck Nordic Capital DK 02/2005  DBO  
Fameco Group Credelity Capital SE 10/2005  DBO  
Ferrosan Altor Equity Partners DK 02/2005  Other  
Fiskarhedenvillan Polaris SE 03/2007  Other  
Flexlink AAC Capital Partners SE 04/2005  SBO  
Forchem Oy MB Rahastot FI 01/2007  Other  
Gambro EQT SE 07/2006  Other  
Get Candover NO 01/2006 01/2007 DBO SBO 
Glud & Marstrand AAC Capital Partners DK 03/2005  SBO  
Grycksbo Accent Equity Partners SE 03/2006 03/2010 DBO STR* 
Haanpaa Group Pamplona FI 07/2005  SBO  
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Sample firm PE firm Country Entry Exit Entry 
type 
Exit 
type 
Haarslev Odin Equity Partners DK 04/2006  Other  
Hamlet Protein Polaris DK 06/2007  Other  
Handicare Herkules Capital NO 06/2005 11/2010 SBO SBO 
Hatteland Display Herkules Capital NO 03/2007  Other  
Helly Hansen Altor Equity Partners NO 11/2006  SBO  
Helo AAC Capital Partners FI 11/2006  SBO  
HusCompagniet   Axcel DK 10/2006 04/2011 Other SBO 
Inflight Service Capman SE 09/2005 12/2009 Other SBO 
Infocare Capman NO 07/2005  SBO  
Inspecta 3i Group FI 06/2007  SBO  
Interbuild LD Invest Equity DK 01/2007  Other  
Isabergs Rapid Segulah SE 12/2006 03/2010 Other STR* 
ISS EQT, Goldman Sachs Capital Partners DK 06/2005  Other  
Jetpak Polaris SE 12/2005  DBO  
Kemetyl Group Segulah SE 01/2007  DBO  
KGH Custom Services Procuritas SE 06/2007  Other  
Kid Interiør Industri Kapital NO 06/2005 08/2009 Other Bank-
ruptcy 
Komas Capman FI 01/2007  Other  
Kompan Nordic Capital DK 05/2005  Other  
Kwintet Industri Kapital DK 11/2005  SBO  
Lekolar 3i Group SE 03/2007  SBO  
LGT Logistics Litorina SE 10/2005 04/2009 DBO SBO 
Life Europe Norvestor NO 12/2005  Other  
Logstor Montagu DK 05/2006  SBO  
Lujapalvelut Sponsor Capital FI 12/2006  DBO  
Lundhags EQT SE 12/2006  DBO  
Luvata Nordic Capital FI 06/2005  DBO  
Maintpartner Capman SE 10/2006  DBO  
Malthus Reiten & Co NO 11/2006  Other  
Medisize Ratos FI 11/2006  DBO  
Micro Matic Norge Herkules Capital NO 01/2007  Other  
Mobile Climate Control Ratos SE 04/2007  Other  
Moventas Industri Kapital FI 01/2007  SBO  
MQ Retail Capman SE 05/2006  Other  
Multicom Security GMT Communication Partners SE 03/2005  SBO  
Munksjö EQT SE 03/2005  DBO  
Navico Altor Equity Partners NO 09/2005  DBO  
NEA Group Segulah SE 11/2006 07/2010 Other STR* 
Netcompany Axcel DK 08/2006  Other  
Nille Herkules Capital NO 06/2006 05/2011 Other SBO 
Nimbus boats Altor Equity Partners SE 02/2006  Other  
Noa Noa Axcel DK 12/2006  Other  
Noratel Herkules Capital NO 01/2005  Other  
Norpe Oy MB Rahastot FI 09/2005  Other  
North Trade Procuritas SE 07/2006  Other  
Notabene Reiten & Co NO 04/2006  Other  
Novenco Dania Capital DK 03/2006  DBO  
NVS Installation Triton SE 06/2006 11/2008 SBO STR* 
Palodex Group Altor Equity Partners FI 09/2005 11/2009 DBO STR* 
Panorama Gruppen Norvestor NO 05/2005  Other  
Pelly Litorina SE 12/2006  Other  
Permobil Nordic Capital SE 01/2006  Other  
Perstorp PAI Partners SE 12/2005  SBO  
Phadia Cinven SE 01/2007  SBO  
PIAB Altor Equity Partners SE 07/2006  Other  
Plastal Nordic Capital SE 02/2005 11/2009 SBO Bank-
ruptcy 
PMC Group Segulah SE 07/2005  DBO  
Pouttu Sponsor Capital FI 01/2007  Other  
Q-Matic Altor Equity Partners SE 06/2007  SBO  
R82 LD Invest Equity DK 12/2005  Other  
S:t Eriks Segulah SE 06/2005  DBO  
Saddler Scandinavia Credelity Capital SE 12/2006  Other  
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SafeRoad Group Reiten & Co NO 07/2005 09/2008 Other SBO 
Sanitec EQT FI 04/2005  SBO  
SB Seating Ratos NO 05/2007  Other  
Scan Global Logistics Odin Equity Partners DK 12/2006  Other  
Scandbook Accent Equity Partners SE 10/2006 03/2010 DBO IPO 
Scandic Hotels EQT SE 05/2007  DBO  
Semantix Accent Equity Partners SE 02/2006 12/2009 DBO SBO 
SFK Systems LD Invest Equity DK 01/2006  DBO  
Smoke Free Systems Credelity Capital SE 01/2007  Other  
SPT Group Altor Equity Partners NO 06/2006  SBO  
Suomen Lähikauppa Industri Kapital FI 04/2007  Other  
Sydtotal Priveq Partners SE 06/2007  Other  
Tammermatic Group Sentica Partners FI 01/2007  Other  
TCM Group Axcel DK 09/2006  Other  
TDC Apax Partners DK 02/2006  Other  
Tesab Accent Equity Partners SE 01/2006  Other  
Tilbords Herkules Capital NO 04/2007  Other  
Unifeeder Montagu DK 06/2007  Other  
Ursviken Group Sentica Partners FI 01/2006  Other  
Walki Wisa Capman FI 06/2007  DBO  
Welltec Riverside DK 05/2005 07/2007 Other SBO 
Vernal LD Invest Equity DK 06/2006  Other  
VIA Travel Group FSN Capital NO 09/2005  Other  
Visma HgCapital NO 06/2006 09/2010 PTP SBO 
Wrist Group Altor Equity Partners DK 05/2007   Other   
*Strategic buyer; **Financial buyer 
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Appendix B – Peer groups 
Sample firm NACE Industry description Geography Asset 
range  
Size  
Aalborg Industries 2530 Manufacture of steam generators, except central heating hot water 
boilers 
Europe 1.8 5 
Addpro 4651 Wholesale of computers, computer peripheral equipment and software Nordic 0.2 12 
Ahlsell 4674 Wholesale of hardware, plumbing and heating equipment and supplies Europe 1.1 6 
A-Katsastus 7120 Technical testing and analysis Nordic 1.1 5 
Aleris 8730 Residential care activities for the elderly and disabled Europe 0.6 5 
Alignment Systems 2651 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and 
navigation 
Nordic 0.2 7 
Alimak Hek 2822 Manufacture of lifting and handling equipment Nordic 1 6 
Ambea 8810 Social work activities without accommodation for the elderly and 
disabled 
Europe 1 5 
Annas Pepparkakor 1072 Manufacture of rusks and biscuits; manufacture of preserved pastry 
goods and cakes 
Nordic 1.7 5 
Anticimex 8129 Other cleaning activities Europe 0.5 5 
Arcus-Gruppen 1101 Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits Nordic 2 5 
Arovit Petfood 1092 Manufacture of prepared pet foods Europe 0.6 5 
Asiakastieto 8291 Activities of collection agencies and credit bureaus Nordic 1.1 7 
Atelje Margaretha 4791 Retail sale via mail order houses or via Internet Nordic 0.2 10 
Atos Medical 3250 Manufacture of medical and dental instruments and supplies Nordic 0.4 5 
Attendo 8730 Residential care activities for the elderly and disabled Europe 1.3 6 
Aura Light 2740 Manufacture of electric lighting equipment Nordic 1 6 
Ball Group 4642 Wholesale of clothing and footwear Nordic 0.3 5 
Bang & Olufsen 
Medicom 
3250 Manufacture of medical and dental instruments and supplies Nordic 0.3 5 
Barona Group 7820 Temporary employment agency activities Nordic 0.4 5 
BecoTek Metal Group 2453 Casting of light metals Nordic 2.2 5 
Beerenberg Corp 0910 Support activities for petroleum and natural gas extraction Nordic 0.5 8 
BIVA Møbler 4759 Retail sale of furniture, lighting equipment and other household 
articles in specialised stores 
Nordic 0.2 7 
Blueway AS 5110 Passenger air transport Europe 0.2 8 
Bodilsen 3109 Manufacture of other furniture Nordic 0.4 5 
Bravida 4322 Plumbing, heat and air-conditioning installation Europe 1.2 8 
BTX Group 4642 Wholesale of clothing and footwear Nordic 0.9 5 
Byggmax 4752 Retail sale of hardware, paints and glass in specialised stores Nordic 0.4 5 
Capio 8610 Hospital activities Europe 1.1 5 
Cardinal foods 1012 Processing and preserving of poultry meat Nordic 1.5 5 
Chr. Hansen 2110 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products Europe 0.4 5 
Cimbria 2822 Manufacture of lifting and handling equipment Nordic 0.4 5 
Color Print 1812 Other printing Nordic 0.7 5 
Com Hem 6110 Wired telecommunications activities Nordic 0.7 5 
Contex Group 2620 Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment Europe 0.4 8 
Dako 2059 Manufacture of other chemical products nec Europe 0.3 10 
DISA Holding 2892 Manufacture of machinery for mining, quarrying and construction Nordic 1.7 7 
EET Nordic 4651 Wholesale of computers, computer peripheral equipment and software Nordic 0.2 9 
EFG European Furniture 
Group 
3101 Manufacture of office and shop furniture Europe 0.6 6 
Elematic 2892 Manufacture of machinery for mining, quarrying and construction Nordic 1.7 7 
Elixia 9313 Fitness facilit ies Europe 2 12 
Erätukku 4690 Non-specialised wholesale trade Nordic 0.5 5 
EskoArtwork 2620 Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment Europe 0.2 5 
Espresso House Holding 5610 Restaurants and mobile food service activities Nordic 0.3 5 
Euro Cater 4639 Non-specialised wholesale of food, beverages and tobacco Nordic 0.7 7 
EuroMaint 3317 Repair and maintenance of other transport equipment Europe 1.6 5 
European House of Beds 3103 Manufacture of mattresses Nordic 1 6 
Falck 8020 Security systems service activities Europe 2.4 5 
Fameco Group 4674 Wholesale of hardware, plumbing and heating equipment and supplies Nordic 0.2 13 
Ferrosan 1089 Manufacture of other food products nec Nordic 0.7 5 
Fiskarhedenvillan 4673 Wholesale of wood, construction materials and sanitary equipment Nordic 0.2 22 
Flexlink 2822 Manufacture of lifting and handling equipment Nordic 0.5 5 
Forchem Oy 2014 Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals Nordic 0.6 5 
Gambro 4646 Wholesale of pharmaceutical goods Europe 1.2 6 
Get 6110 Wired telecommunications activities Nordic 0.4 7 
Glud & Marstrand 2592 Manufacture of light metal packaging Europe 0.2 9 
Grycksbo 1712 Manufacture of paper and paperboard Nordic 0.3 5 
Haanpaa Group 4941 Freight transport by road Nordic 0.9 5 
Haarslev 2899 Manufacture of other special-purpose machinery nec Nordic 0.6 5 
Hamlet Protein 1091 Manufacture of prepared feeds for farm animals Nordic 0.7 5 
Handicare 4646 Wholesale of pharmaceutical goods Nordic 0.3 5 
Hatteland Display 4669 Wholesale of other machinery and equipment Nordic 0.2 8 
Helly Hansen 1419 Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories Europe 0.5 6 
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Helo 2751 Manufacture of electric domestic appliances Nordic 0.9 5 
HusCompagniet   4120 Construction of residential and non-residential buildings Nordic 0.2 6 
Inflight Service 4799 Other retail sale not in stores, stalls or markets Nordic 2.5 6 
Infocare 9511 Repair of computers and peripheral equipment Europe 0.9 5 
Inspecta 7120 Technical testing and analysis Nordic 0.6 6 
Interbuild 1623 Manufacture of other builders' carpentry and joinery Nordic 0.4 5 
Isabergs Rapid 2573 Manufacture of tools Nordic 1.8 5 
ISS 8110 Combined facilit ies support activities Europe 2.5 2 
Jetpak 5229 Other transportation support activities Nordic 0.2 10 
Kemetyl Group 2041 Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing 
preparations 
Nordic 1.8 5 
KGH Custom Services 5229 Other transportation support activities Nordic 0.2 18 
Kid Interiør 4751 Retail sale of textiles in specialised stores Nordic 2.5 5 
Komas 2562 Machining Nordic 0.9 5 
Kompan 3230 Manufacture of sports goods Europe 0.8 5 
Kwintet  4642 Wholesale of clothing and footwear Nordic 2.2 5 
Lekolar 4647 Wholesale of furniture, carpets and lighting equipment Nordic 1.7 5 
LGT Logistics 5229 Other transportation support activities Nordic 0.2 18 
Life Europe 4729 Other retail sale of food in specialised stores Europe 0.4 5 
Logstor 2420 Manufacture of tubes, pipes, hollow profiles and related fitt ings, of 
steel 
Europe 0.3 5 
Lujapalvelut  8110 Combined facilit ies support activities Nordic 1 5 
Lundhags 4642 Wholesale of clothing and footwear Nordic 0.2 8 
Luvata 2444 Copper production Europe 2.2 7 
Maintpartner 3312 Repair of machinery Nordic 0.3 5 
Malthus 4120 Construction of residential and non-residential buildings Nordic 0.2 9 
Medisize 2229 Manufacture of other plastic products Nordic 0.5 5 
Micro Matic Norge 4669 Wholesale of other machinery and equipment Nordic 0.2 19 
Mobile Climate Control 2825 Manufacture of non-domestic cooling and ventilation equipment Nordic 0.5 5 
Moventas 2599 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products nec Europe 0.3 7 
MQ Retail 4771 Retail sale of clothing in specialised stores Nordic 1.2 6 
Multicom Security 6110 Wired telecommunications activities Nordic 0.2 6 
Munksjö 1712 Manufacture of paper and paperboard Europe 0.2 7 
Navico 7112 Engineering activities and related technical consultancy Nordic 0.4 7 
NEA Group 4321 Electrical installation Europe 0.2 15 
Netcompany 6202 Computer consultancy activities Nordic 0.2 15 
Nille 4719 Other retail sale in non-specialised stores Nordic 0.2 6 
Nimbus boats 3012 Building of pleasure and sporting boats Nordic 2 6 
Noa Noa 4771 Retail sale of clothing in specialised stores Nordic 1.1 5 
Noratel 2711 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers Nordic 0.5 5 
Norpe Oy 2825 Manufacture of non-domestic cooling and ventilation equipment Nordic 0.3 8 
North Trade 4711 Retail sale in non-specialised stores with food, beverages or tobacco 
predominating 
Nordic 0.2 12 
Notabene 4761 Retail sale of books in specialised stores Nordic 1.2 5 
Novenco 2825 Manufacture of non-domestic cooling and ventilation equipment Nordic 0.4 6 
NVS Installation 4322 Plumbing, heat and air-conditioning installation Nordic 1.9 6 
Palodex Group 2660 Manufacture of irradiation, electromedical and electrotherapeutic 
equipment 
Nordic 1.5 5 
Panorama Gruppen 4648 Wholesale of watches and jewellery Europe 0.3 5 
Pelly 2599 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products nec Nordic 0.2 7 
Permobil 3092 Manufacture of bicycles and invalid carriages Europe 0.9 6 
Perstorp 2013 Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals Europe 0.8 6 
Phadia 2059 Manufacture of other chemical products nec Europe 0.6 10 
PIAB 2813 Manufacture of other pumps and compressors Nordic 0.5 6 
Plastal 2932 Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor vehicles Europe 0.2 7 
PMC Group 2822 Manufacture of lifting and handling equipment Nordic 0.6 5 
Pouttu 1013 Production of meat and poultry meat products Nordic 0.2 5 
Q-Matic 2790 Manufacture of other electrical equipment Nordic 2.2 6 
R82 3092 Manufacture of bicycles and invalid carriages Nordic 0.8 6 
S:t Eriks 2361 Manufacture of concrete products for construction purposes Nordic 0.2 5 
Saddler Scandinavia 4649 Wholesale of other household goods Nordic 0.2 31 
SafeRoad Group 2511 Manufacture of metal structures and parts of structures Nordic 1.7 9 
Sanitec 2342 Manufacture of ceramic sanitary fixtures Europe 2.5 6 
SB Seating 3101 Manufacture of office and shop furniture Europe 0.6 5 
Scan Global Logistics 5229 Other transportation support activities Nordic 0.3 8 
Scandbook 1812 Other printing Nordic 0.2 7 
Scandic Hotels 5510 Hotels and similar accommodation Europe 0.2 7 
Semantix* 7430 Translation and interpretation activities Europe 2.5 3 
SFK Systems 2893 Manufacture of machinery for food, beverage and tobacco processing Nordic 1.3 6 
Smoke Free Systems 4673 Wholesale of wood, construction materials and sanitary equipment Nordic 0.2 11 
SPT Group 6201 Computer programming activities Nordic 0.4 6 
Suomen Lähikauppa 4690 Non-specialised wholesale trade Nordic 1.1 5 
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Sydtotal 4322 Plumbing, heat and air-conditioning installation Nordic 0.5 5 
Tammermatic Group 2899 Manufacture of other special-purpose machinery nec Nordic 0.2 6 
TCM Group 4778 Other retail sale of new goods in specialised stores Nordic 1.2 5 
TDC 6110 Wired telecommunications activities Europe 0.6 6 
Tesab 2892 Manufacture of machinery for mining, quarrying and construction Nordic 0.5 6 
T ilbords 4644 Wholesale of china and glassware and cleaning materials Nordic 0.4 5 
Unifeeder 5020 Sea and coastal freight water transport Nordic 0.2 8 
Ursviken Group 2841 Manufacture of metal forming machinery Nordic 0.8 5 
Walki Wisa 1712 Manufacture of paper and paperboard Nordic 0.2 5 
Welltec 0910 Support activities for petroleum and natural gas extraction Nordic 0.4 7 
Vernal 4646 Wholesale of pharmaceutical goods Nordic 0.2 7 
VIA Travel Group 7911 Travel agency activities Nordic 0.7 5 
Vísma 6201 Computer programming activities Nordic 0.2 6 
Wrist Group 4671 Wholesale of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels and related products Nordic 0.5 5 
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Appendix C – Supplementary tables 
Table 18 – Unadjusted changes in operating performance 2007-2009 (grouped by 
country) 
The table reports unadjusted changes in operating performance grouped by country. EBITDA/sales 
and EBITDA/total assets is reported in percentage points and subtracts median of peer group; all other 
measures are percentage changes subtracted by peer group change in median. Values in parentheses 
show number of observations and positive observations.  Significance levels are based on two-tailed 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. *, **, and *** denote levels that are significantly different from zero at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
  Sweden Denmark Norway Finland 
A. Growth         
Sales growth 2.25 % (51;27) 0.41 % (34;18) 11.88 %  (24;16)* 0.39 % (18;9) 
B. Profitability         
EBITDA/sales -0.100 (52;23) -1.620 (34;13) 0.015 (24;12) -0.973 (16;6) 
C. Return to assets         
EBITDA/total assets  1.456 (50;32) -1.218 (35;16) 0.766 (23;14) -2.207 (15;7) 
D. Employment         
Sales/employee -2.88 % (48;21) -3.60 % (32;14) 3.14 % (4;2) -5.99 % (18;8) 
Personnel costs/sales  7.22 %  (33;26)*** 4.50 %  (34;25)*** 7.32 %  (20;13)** 5.69 % (15;9) 
Avg cost of employee  -0.05 % (30;15) 6.47 % (33;19)** n.a. (0;0) 1.60 % (15;8) 
E. Working capital         
NWC/sales  -9.72 %  (44;15)** -17.68 %  (31;5)*** -10.49 % (21;7) -3.49 % (18;7) 
Stocks/sales -12.19 % (43;11)*** -8.51 %  (32;10)** -15.21 % (19;7) -9.83 % (14;5) 
Receivables/sales  -9.78 %  (48;15)** -21.41 %  (32;8)*** 4.86 % (21;11) -13.85 % (17;6)* 
Payables/sales -12.66 % (49;14)*** -12.50 % (34;15) -2.12 % (21;8) -0.11 % (17;8) 
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Table 19 – Unadjusted changes in operating performance 2007-2009 (grouped by buyout 
type) 
The table reports unadjusted changes in operating performance grouped by buyout type. 
EBITDA/sales and EBITDA/total assets is reported in percentage points and subtracts median of peer 
group; all other measures are percentage changes subtracted by peer group change in median. Values 
in parentheses show number of observations and positive observations.  Significance levels are based 
on two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test. *, **, and *** denote levels that are significantly different 
from zero at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
  Public-to-private Secondary buyouts Divisional buyouts Other 
A. Growth         
Sales growth -5.33 % (8;3) 8.98 %  (26;19)** 11.13 % (27;15) -0.13 % (66;33) 
B. Profitability         
EBITDA/sales -2.10 (8;2) -0.16 (26;10) 2.32 (27;15) -0.47 (65;27) 
C. Return to assets         
EBITDA/total assets  -2.58 (8;1) 1.05 (23;15) 1.83 (26;16) 0.76 (66;37) 
D. Employment         
Sales/employee -4.73 % (7;3) -3.22 % (23;10) -4.53 % (24;11) -1.47 % (48;21) 
Personnel costs/sales  1.47 % (6;4) 9.43 %  (16;12)*** 6.47 % (20;13) 6.02 %  (60;44)*** 
Avg cost of employee  2.43 % (5;3) -0.65 % (13;5) 3.33 % (17;10) 1.82 %  (43;24)* 
E. Working capital         
NWC/sales  -33.62 % (5;0)*** -11.51 % (24;7)* -3.10 % (23;10) -13.81 % (62;17)*** 
Stocks/sales -7.38 % (6;1) -9.16 %  (23;7)** -10.68 %  (21;6)* -12.27 % (58;19)** 
Receivables/sales -18.93 % (7;2) -11.68 % (24;4)*** -12.04 %  (25;9)** -9.15 %  (62;25)** 
Payables/sales 0.40 % (7;4) -12.66 % (25;8) -32.14 %  (25;8)** -6.99 % (64;25) 
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Table 20 – Summary of adjusted 2007-2009 changes in key operating measures 
The table presents 2007-2009 adjusted changes of key operating measures. EBITDA/sales and 
EBITDA/total assets is reported in percentage points; all other measures in percentage changes. 
Significance levels are based on two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test (median) and t-test (mean). ***, 
**, and * denote significant difference from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 N 5 % 95 % Median Mean St.dev 
EBITDA/sales  126 -9.76 16.05 1.64*** 1.96** 8.83 
EBITDA/total assets  123 -12.64 20.57 2.26***  2.91** 12.34 
Sales growth  127 -36.2 % 89.7 % 15.1 %***  20.2 %*** 40.7 % 
Sales/employee  102 -30.4 % 76.2 % 4.9 %***  12.8 %*** 36.0 % 
Personnel costs/sales  101 -35.4 % 27.8 % 0.7 %   -1.0 % 20.9 % 
Average cost of employee  77 -23.7 % 73.4 % 1.0 % 9.6 %** 34.8 % 
Net working capital/sales 112 -156.2 % 89.7 % -13.1 %** -15.6 %** 70.7 % 
Stocks/sales  108 -116.1 % 73.1 % -7.1 %** -17.5 %** 77.3 % 
Receivables/sales  118 -108.5 % 73.0 % -8.6 %* -7.6 % 69.3 % 
Payables/sales  121 -83.8 % 92.5 % -3.4 % 2.0 % 86.0 % 
 
 
